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Abstract: This project provides an alternative theoretical perspective from which to assess 
the influence of power in media narrative construction of politically contentious issues, in 
this case, climate change.  There has been a prolific amount of research addressing the 
problem of climate change.  I argue that most of this research has neglected power as a 
key dimension in the persistence of climate change inaction.  This neglect is a product of 
myriad factors: conceptual inconsistencies in the definition of “framing”; limitations to 
conventional analytic frameworks in situating media in larger social and political 
contexts; properly orienting key political actors and sponsors in the construction of 
framing strategies; and a lack of assessing the relationship of powerful actors and 
institutions through time.  This project first orients key political actors in relation to one 
another and their role in the production of climate change discourse.  Using Field Theory, 
I purport to properly situate institutional fields by considering coordinative and 
oppositional frames in the print news media. This theoretical framework allows me to 
construct a larger, dynamic constellation of social and political power, departing from 
traditional “agentic vs. hegemonic” dichotomous standpoints. To substantiate this I 
investigate a longitudinal analysis of media narratives from 1990-2015.  I contend that 
these data demonstrates that climate change inaction is persistent because of surplus 
power and resources wielded by elite institutions, allowing them to permeate and elicit 
support from adjacent institutional fields.  This effectively forestalls action in spite of 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary literature discussing the processes, influences, and effects of mass 
media narratives on public discourse has grown in the past decade.  At the vanguard of 
this research has been the field of communications, which has delved into a variety of 
different aspects of this phenomenon.  These include gatekeeping, agenda setting, 
political orientation of news affiliates, analyses of news bias, power dynamics, and 
journalistic norms (Altheide 1984; Simon and Xenos 2000; Callaghan and Schnell 2001; 
Carragee and Roefs 2004; Boykoff 2006; Habermas 2006; Boykoff 2007; and Boykoff 
and Boycoff 2007).  Recent work in sociology has also contributed to this literature, 
particularly in discussing the role the media plays in the raging public debate over the 
legitimacy and “truth” of climate change (for some examples see Brossard, Shanahan, 
and McComas 2004; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008; and 
Lefsrud and Meyer 2012).  However, with exception of very few (see Farrell 2015a, 
2015b for examples of these), the literature has not addressed the consideration of power 
in media research on climate change (Carragee and Roefs 2004).  The lack of research in 
this particular area is due to the nature of the powerful; elites have consistently utilized 
their political and social power to shroud themselves in secrecy (Mills 1956; Plankey-
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Videla 2012).  There is little doubt that most citizens, particularly in technologically 
saturated and dependent societies such as the United States and Canada, rarely 
proactively shape their perception of the world.  Instead they allow mass media to 
establish their world view.  Here, media constructs a hyper reality for their audience 
(Simon and Xenos 2000; Schulz 2004; Cottle 2006; and Farrell 2015).  However, there is 
considerable disagreement in communications literature on media’s part in constructing 
climate change discourse.  On one end of the spectrum are scholars that subscribe to a 
“hegemonic thesis,” believing that mass media simply acts as a means for elite actors to 
proliferate dominant class ideologies among the public (van Dijk 1995; Simon and Xenos 
2000; and Block 2013).  Contrary to this are academics who believe that media is 
afforded discretion in the depiction of information.  These scholars argue that the power 
of mass media resides in mediation and production frames.  In other words, agency.  
Media actively chooses what information reaches their audience (Altheide 1984; 
Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; and Anderson 2009). 
 Additionally, media, as an institution, is located in the unique spatial geography to 
influence and critique other social institutions.  Media also serves as a means to view 
those institutions and their relationships with one another.  Thus, it provides a convenient 
lens through which to explore the spatial relationships between these institutions and their 
spheres of influence.  The relationships, articulated spatially, within and between these 
“fields” form linkages articulating a hierarchical orientation of institutional power in 
society.  By charting these relationships, the relative strength of them, and their changes 
over time, I demonstrate which institutions hold the most power and thus, contribute most 
to the reproduction of systems of inequality in our society.  
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 This project seeks to first investigate the positioning of predominant print news 
media in the framing climate change.  Next, I orient key political actors within these texts 
to explore how climate change discourse is constructed by social institutions in North 
America.  Then,  by introducing Field Theory as an important analytic tool to interrogate 
institutional power dynamics, I use media discourse on the development of climate 
change to highlight the interdependent relationship between these actors, their 
institutions, and their overall orientation in the (re)production of structures of power in 
the United States and Canada from 1990-2015.  To explore these exchanges, I use the 
following questions to guide this project: How do key print news media sources frame 
climate change?  What action and collective action frames do institutional actors employ 
in response to the developing crisis of climate change?  How do these strategic frames 
evolve through time?  What role do key individual and institutional actors play in the 
precipitation of the climate change crisis, shaping its trajectory, and ultimately help or 
hinder changing field dynamics in the overall constellation of fields?
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
To provide an appropriate context for addressing the institutional power dynamics 
of climate change demonstrated in newspaper print media I will begin by surveying 
relevant literatures on media framing. Before I can position key actors and their 
narratives, I must first determine the perspective each particular publication adopts to 
properly contextualize the construction of print news media climate change discourse.  
While there are swaths of significant research contributing to this area within social 
movements’ literature, I will primarily highlight conversations on framing occurring 
within the field of communications.  Focusing on this discipline strategically highlights 
how media frames particular issues, which is of paramount importance as print news 
media is the sole source of data analyzed in this project.  This effort is also an attempt to 
engage in an active conversation across academic lines rather than neglecting media 
specific literatures to favor a discipline-centric approach.  Additionally, there is a rift in 
research forming a polarity among communications scholars as to whether or not media 
acts in an agentic or hegemonic capacity is of central interest to this project.  Considering 
both perspectives is critical in conceptualizing the dynamic nature of media and its 
influence on constructing and perpetuating information. 
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Next, I will summarize “Field Theory” and its specific importance in analyzing 
predominant institutional power dynamics.  Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) synthesis of 
Bourdieu’s articulation of fields, institutional theory, social movements, network 
analysis, and structural analysis is a powerful tool in interrogating how social institutions 
negotiate power in relation to one another to (re)produce the prevailing institutional 
hierarchy when confronted by a crisis such as climate change.  Utilizing field theory in 
this project provides a unique theoretical perspective to explore the often-neglected 
influence of power in the evolution of climate change discourse in the media (Carragee 
and Roefs 2004).  Lastly, using field theory demonstrates how innovative theorizing can 
elucidate new perspectives on a well-studied, complex social problem.    
 
What is Media Framing? 
Before attempting to unveil the potential connection between climate change 
discourses and mass media frames, I will define and conceptualize framing.  Framing has 
been used in many disciplines to describe the way society contextualizes and sets 
boundaries for the interpretation of a particular discourse.  Framing works in same way as 
a window.  Constraining our ability to view the outside world.  All other imagery is 
obscured by the opacity of the frame and that which lies around it.  Put succinctly:  
We can define framing as the process of culling a few elements of 
perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections 
among them to promote a particular interpretation... …to frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993; 2004; 2007). 
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In other words, framing acts as a means to not only describe an issue, but to assign 
meaning to it.  Once meaning has been established, the frame makes moral judgements 
about the problem and assign blame to causal agents.  Lastly, media provides a 
prescriptive assessment of how the audience should feel about the problem or what action 
should be taken.  There is extensive extant literature exploring this framing phenomenon 
and how audiences interpret these synthesized communications.  Other research attends 
to the influence these interpretations have on understanding an issue.  Cohen (1963 as 
quoted in Entman 2007: 165) articulates this in a pragmatic sense when he suggests that 
“the media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (emphasis in the original).  
While apparently a minor difference, what we think about often determines our 
understanding of a particular topic (Entman 2007: 165).  This suggests that framing in 
inherently teleological.  With this in mind, it is easy to see how those with inequitable 
shares of political and social power can influence discourse, and subsequently, action, 
concerning social issues.  
Hegemony v. Agency in Mass Media 
Recent public opinion research has found that the origins of public opinion are 
resonant with the narratives found in elite discourse (Page, Shapiro, Dempsey 1987; 
Simon and Xenos 2000; Entman 2007).  Additionally, it is understood that most of our 
public population is reliant upon mass media to acquire its information (particularly that 
which is political in nature).  The inferred connection between these narratives borne of 
elite discourse and its consequential dissemination via the apparatus of mass media has 
proven more difficult to unveil.  Some scholars suggest integrating Gramsci’s hegemony 
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as the underlying nexus through which these discursive sites can be connected, better 
equipping scholars to investigate the elite’s proliferation and indoctrination of a dominant 
class ideology (Carragee and Roefs 2004; Snow, Tan, and Owens 2013).  The elites 
understand the semiotic nature of media; its ability to facilitate the publics’ construction 
of reality through symbols, language, and meaning.  The “coding” of these messages is 
imperative in the consideration of framing strategic action as articulated by different 
media agents.  According to authors like Innis and McLuhan (as cited in Schulz 2004), 
“every medium has a ‘bias’ affecting the reception of its messages and transforming the 
recipients’ modes of consciousness.”  This realization is not only applicable to fictional 
topics and materials, but non-fictional ones as well.  Understanding that these conceived 
“truths” are, at least in part, constructed subjectively is integral to the interpretation of our 
social world (Simon and Xenos 2000; Weber 1962).  To compound this effect, the 
pervasive expansion of technology continues to increase the power of media as an 
economic tool.  Media messages incite responses, which, consequently, create a requisite 
need for more media messages in a variety of different contexts that connect and 
intertwine with one another.  This intensification process creates a continuous, perpetual 
series of self-sustaining “feedback loops” of events being disseminated by the media and 
the media covering he development of those events and others (Kepplinger 2002 as cited 
in Schulz 2004).  In other words, the technological development of contemporary media 
creates a pervasive and continuous stream of information that demands a higher level of 
attention from its audience.  This necessarily disconnects and displaces direct interaction 
with the world.  Media acts as a substitute, dictating our interpretation of the world. 
7 
 
This reciprocal relationship between audience and mass media, fueled by 
economic incentive and opportunity, suggests another possibility that refutes the 
hegemonic thesis; mass media possesses a degree of agency (Altheide 1984).  These 
scholars posit that mass media does not simply act as a medium for transmittance, but 
operates independently from elite influence, selecting, omitting, reshaping and 
perpetuating their own interpretive strategic action frames.  Media then can act as, both, 
perpetuators of source frames as well as originators of their own unique narratives 
(Callaghan and Schnell 2001).  From this standpoint, there are three particular ways that 
media might craft and disseminate information.  First, they might articulate a one-
dimensional story, giving power and visibility only to one particular group.  Second, they 
might portray the story as multi-faceted, giving all “sides” a voice, highlighting the 
complexity of the story and fostering conflict.  Lastly, media can choose not to air the 
story, obfuscating the issue entirely.  In this way, the power that mass media wields is 
certainly not limited to what is ostensible.  Indeed, mass media can choose to articulate 
and prioritize certain frames over others. However, what is equally significant, and 
perhaps more so, is their discretion to suppress or silence certain actors, thus controlling 
the salience of vantage points or entire issues altogether (Anderson 2009).  The 
implications of this power led to a theoretical distinction of mass media as a separate 
institution capable of interacting with and enacting significant influence on the power 
dynamics found in other institutions (Hjarvard 2008).  Following this logic, media 
occupies the unique position in which it has the proclivity to impact other institutions.  
Media is perhaps the only institution that is charged with detailing the strategic actions of 
other institutions, shaping public perception on those institutions.  These commentaries 
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may potentially influence corporate financial allocations or public support and 
investment.  Structurally, they might even affect the relative significance of all other 
institutions depending on how media narratives are constructed, and who(m) those 
particular constructions endorse or condemn.  This is particularly true when considering 
public opinion research on public dogma.  Research has demonstrated that contemporary 
dogma is formed by individuals unable or unwilling to construct their own meanings, 
leading them to rely on external sources such as the media, to construct it for them.  
However, the use of an institutional conceptual framework is too rigid and inflexible to 
capture the dynamic and fluid nature of the power dynamics found within and between 
mass media and proximal institutions with whom it is entangled (Block 2013).  To 
expand the power of our analytic framework to incorporate and attend to these fluid 
dynamics, I take the substance of institutional theory and incorporate it into a larger 
constitution, the theory of “fields” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).   
 
An Introduction to “Field Theory” 
“Field theory” is a multi-faceted perspective that forms the theoretical framework 
implemented by this project.  Using power as common currency between institutions, 
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) incorporate work from Bourdieu, social movements, 
network analysis, and Giddens to create a fluid, dynamic, and evolutionary theory on the 
interconnectedness between organizations in contemporary society.   
Many contemporary conflict scholars have used the general concept of a “field” to 
describe any particular, distinctive spatial arena within which there are inequitable 
distributions of power and resources (Arthur 1988, 1989; Bourdieu [1997] 2000; Fligstein 
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1996; Fligstein & McAdam 2012; Hannan and Freeman 1977; McAdam 1999; Powell et 
al. 2005; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Thelen 2004).  Bourdieu posits, “Each 
field is characterized by the pursuit of a specific goal, tending to favor no less absolute 
investments by all (and only) those who possess the required dispositions” (Bourdieu 
[1997] 2000: 11).  These “fields” can emerge in a variety of different contexts and in all 
levels of analysis.  This concept is not only used to describe organizations, but extends its 
theoretical reach to other social orders.  While an organization is objective, and has clear 
and distinguishable boundaries, a “field” is abstract.  Fields are socially constructed 
social orders that define an arena for contestation between two or more groups.  The 
flexibility of the concept of fields allows for a complex understanding of an intricate 
tapestry of interdependent yet distinct constituents which marry into a larger constellation 
of fields that constitutes the structural fabric of our social world.   
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) advance Bourdieu’s concept, fundamentally rooted 
in power dynamics, by purposing the apparatus to understanding not only the relationship 
within, but also between, what they label “strategic action fields” (SAF).   Defined as 
“fundamental units of collective action in society” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 9), each 
of these is composed by two types of actors competing for dominance, challengers and 
incumbents.  The social engagement and interaction of these field actors occurs under the 
precept of a mutual understanding of the purpose(s) of the field, the relationship they 
have with one another, and the rules that govern legitimate action in the field (Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012).  Indeed, all those actors in the field understand, at least to some 
degree, the capabilities of every other actor to exert influence and accomplish their own 
particular goals.  This shared, coproduced, and mutually constructed cultural 
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understanding of the “rules” of the SAF is instrumental in reproducing the structure of the 
field and (re)affirming what forms of action are legitimate within each contextually 
distinct field.  A monolithic understanding of an overarching “institutional logic” is too 
rigid and simplistic.  Borrowing from symbolic interactionism, the cultural understanding 
is collectively constructed but individually interpreted based on the relative position of 
that particular actor.  In this way, variant interpretations of what a particular individual 
can accomplish within a field, given contextually situated access to resources within a 
field, helps better elucidate the presence of both agency and structure within and between 
fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). 
SAFs do not occupy spaces entirely independent of one another, but instead, are 
connected and associated with other adjacent, conjoined, and dependent SAFs.  These 
connections between fields serve to mutually reinforce and support a greater latticework 
as a whole, adding stability to structure of society.  Fligstein and McAdam (2012) 
recognize that fields within this network are both nested and contiguous, hierarchical and 
sovereign.  Thus strategic action fields are situated alongside other SAFs, and nested 
within still larger SAFs.   
As Bourdieu ([1989] 1996, [1997] 2000) and Fligstein and McAdam (2012) 
suggest, the most basic tenet of fields is the inequitable distribution of resources, and 
subsequently power, within each.  Incumbents retain the majority of both, while 
challengers do not.  This initial cross-section is not to suggest that fields are not dynamic 
in nature.  The composition of power within a field is in a constant state of flux and is 
characterized by fluidity.  While dynamic in nature, the overall stability of these fields 
remains intact most of the time.  What then might facilitate the destabilization in fields 
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and a reorganization of the power, resources, and constituents within fields?  The 
mechanisms that facilitate the transformation of fields is a point of contention within the 
literature.  The two main perspectives deviate in where they suggest the catalyst for 
transformation occurs spatially; inside or outside the field.  Some theorists suggest that 
change occurs within the field and is facilitated by constant and consistent contestation of 
the status quo power orientations within the field (Powell et al. 2005; Steinmo, Thelen, 
and Longstreth 1992; Thelen 2004).  The second perspective, to which I attend, does not 
discredit the first, but instead suggests that the primary site for the transformation of 
fields occurs outside the field.  This singular, external event is referred to as an 
exogenous shock (Arthur 1988, 1989; Fligstein 1996; Hannan and Freeman 1977; 
McAdam 1999; White 1981 as cited in Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  Depending on its 
magnitude, this exogenous shock can potentially redefine the distribution of power, 
resources, legitimate rules of action, and even the purpose(s) of fields.  Both perspectives 
agree that while fields typically enjoy a relatively stable state, change is the only constant 
within and between fields.  A changing social, cultural, and political environment ensures 
that the challengers are always prodding and probing for new weaknesses in a fields’ 
power structure.  Incumbents are constantly searching for ways to maintain the status 
quo, whether by conceding certain conditions to the challengers to prevent upheaval, or, 
more commonly, forging alliances with more powerful dominant or tangential fields.  
Just as internal relationships between actors were requisite in the comprehension of 
within-field dynamics, alliances are instrumental in understanding the relationships 
between fields, and consequently, the larger constellation that comprises the greater 
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network of institutions. Pathways between institutional actors lay the road map for 
exercises of power that influence social action.   
The State is the first site that all fields look to for alliance formation.  In nearly all 
contemporary societies, the State is the single predominant institution that occupies the 
unique social space to form legitimate rules that govern the actions of all non-state 
strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  The State is also typically 
structured bureaucratically.  This hierarchical structure makes it among the most stable 
and unchangeable organizational orientations (Weber 1962).  These two factors make 
state fields the ideal ally for fields to join with.  The closer this relationship, the better the 
opportunity for incumbents in non-state fields to solidify their hold on their own field, as 
well as favorably position themselves relative to other fields to gain access to power and 
resources.  Connections between fields are made by internal governance units.   Once 
these linkages are formed, internal governance units such as lobbyists, academics, media 
or non-profit organization representatives, etc., maintain these alliances.  These 
relationships are not unilateral.  In reciprocal fashion, the State SAF benefits from its 
association with particularly powerful non-state SAFs by way of legitimation.  
Interestingly, especially in a democratic society, the State granted its power and authority 
through consent.  Accordingly, this State SAF relationship can be fickle.  Dependence on 
legitimation can prompt the State to shift its allegiance to support the transformation of a 
strategic action field to retain the favor of a powerful group.  If the orientation within the 
field changes, the support of the state must likewise change to reflect support for the new 
incumbent.  The civil rights movement was an incredible example of this.  The state was 
reluctant to acknowledge and legitimize the minority vote until the power exerted by 
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these groups on the whole of society became too large to ignore (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012).   
Transformations are precipitated by crises; a tumultuous event that catalyzes a 
movement within a field(s).  These can occur from within or without a field.  War and 
regime changes are the most dramatic examples of an exogenous crisis that can facilitate 
a change in the power dynamics in an entire network of fields.  Threat and opportunity 
are indicative of these events which incite conflict between field participants.  Depending 
on the progress of contentious interaction with other internal actors, calls are made to 
external fields to participate in the contest (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  These 
movements have the potential to shift the landscape of not only a particular field, but 
have the propensity to shift the meaning of the entire society due to the interconnected 
and interdependent structure of the field network,.  This is especially true if these 
transformations are located at the site of the State, or some other centrally oriented field.  
In the case of the State (as the most easily recognizable and archetypal field) the 
dissolution and reformation/transformation of the power structure could, and often does, 
serve to reshape the entire sovereign space over which the former State presided.  These 
changes are often situated in the transformation and emergence of a new predominant 
economic model, which like a painter reusing a canvas, utilizes the same space of the 
previous work but creates an entirely new apparatus with the particular political, social, 
and cultural variegations that compose the new field network.   
Although exogenous shocks are the most common initiate of field transformation, 
this should not suggest that change cannot occur from within, but only that it is a more 
gradual, erosive force as the power distribution within fields is constantly being 
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monitored and reinforced by those in power to preserve the integrity of field’s structure.  
Transformation initiated from this site is exceedingly rare given inequitable access to and 
distribution of power and resources.  Reorganization is also unlikely due to 
misrecognition and reluctance (Bourdieu [1979] 1984, [1984] 2003; Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012).  Challengers often fail to recognize a proper opportunity to initiate a 
potentially transformative movement because of their position in the field.  Remembering 
the situated perspective of actors within a field, positioning often obfuscates a clear 
holistic view of the field.  Thus, an actor’s information about a field’s fragility is 
distorted and incomplete.  Actors are aware of this incomplete perspective which not only 
inhibits detection of a weakness/opportunity to upset the order of a field, but also the 
confidence in the authenticity of such an opportunity.  Lastly, even when correctly 
identified, the repercussions for a failed coup are severe and purposefully well known.  
Therefore, if challengers do possess the aptitude to correctly identify a revolutionary 
opportunity through the clandestine symbolic veil of the incumbent, they are reluctant to 
pursue such an opportunity.   
Having established the general theoretical framework of field theory, I shall 
contextualize it specifically to the climate change issue and situate mass media as a 
strategic action field. 
 
Mass Media as a “Strategic Action Field” 
Schulz (2000) argues that mass media acts as an institutional force, causing 
organizations to account for how they might be represented.  Hjarvard (2004) takes this 
idea one step further and positions media as its own independent institution which exerts 
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force on other proximal institutions to reproduce its own structural position.  Although 
useful in conceptually orienting mass media in the societal organizational hierarchy, this 
institutional analytic framework is too rigid and inflexible to capture the dynamic nature 
of media and its capacity to interact at multiple locations within and across institutional 
hierarchies.  Conceptualizing hierarchical power configurations in this two-dimensional 
space illustrates the limitations and difficulties that traditional frameworks have in 
properly conceptualizing the complexity of the relations between and across institutions.  
Constructing mass media as a field, however, allows for a more appropriate three-
dimensional rendering of the spatial arrangement of these fields.  In order to do this mass 
media must have a set of goals and constituents competing for them as does any other 
field.  As with most other fields in the capitalist economy, revenue is the primary 
motivating factor of media.  As mentioned earlier, mass media is motivated by other 
factors as well.  Their capacity as political and social commentary, for instance.  But 
media indulges these ancillary motivations insofar as they enhance their financial 
profitability.  Complementarily, their capital accumulation is a demonstration of their 
proficiency in those goals (Weber 1968).   Reorganizing media into this conceptual 
paradigm better equips theorists to interpret the meaning interactions of multiple SAF 
simultaneously through time, as well as the implications of those actions in the larger 
field network or constellation of fields.   
The four main strategic action fields that will be the focus of this project are 
centrally oriented around the State.  This is primarily because the reasons stated in the 
discussion of internal governance units and the alliances between fields.  The issue of 
note in this situation is that of climate change, a contentious topic that has become highly 
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politicized in the past three decades, precipitating a polarization on its scientific 
legitimacy and the prescriptive action proposed to alleviate it (Boykoff 2011; Brulle, 
Carmichael, and Jenkins 2012; Klein 2014; McCright, Xiao and Dunlap 2014).  
Considering climate change as an exogenous shock, numerous SAFs are confronted with 
a threat to field stability and thus appeal to the State to act (or not act). 
Industry, when operationalized as a field, employs agents in an attempt to prevent 
any limitation on their ability to emit greenhouse gasses that are intrinsic in the practices 
and processes of cheap production.  These internal governance units (IGUs) take the form 
of lobbyists, academics, other businesses, state officials, and non-profit organizations.  
Within North America, these IGUs are tasked engage with law makers in the United 
States and Canada as well as the international/supranational regulatory community (the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change/UNFCCC, Conference of the 
Parties/COP, North American Free Trade Agreement/NAFTA, Trans-Pacific 
Partnership/TPP) to stymie or prevent regulatory action.  These IGU intermediaries use 
political capital from years of political inculcation and financial contributions to garner 
legislative favor and preserve their dominant position within their respective fields 
(Bourdieu [1984] 2003).  As with the reciprocal relationship between State and non-State 
actors discussed in the theoretical framework above, the influence of the financial 
industry in the electoral process (especially in the United States) is reciprocated in 
legislative action sympathetic to industry desires; particularly subsidization and 
deregulation.  It is important to note that these interactions are between positions, not 
individuals.  Viewing these interactions as exchanges between individuals rather than 
positions suggests a degree of agency between people involved in these interactions 
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rather than the structuring power of institutional structures (Bourdieu [1972] 1977).  
While these considerations are important in the complex interactions held within field 
theory, and there is certainly some important evidence of agency found in the data, the 
contribution of “social skill” is beyond the scope of this particular project and should be 
an intense center for study in later research. The primary focus of this project resides in 
the structural factors that shape the evolution of climate change discourse and subsequent 
action and a consideration of these behaviors longitudinally emphasizes the 
institutionalization of these actions in the continued alliance between state and industry 
fields (Fligstein & McAdam 2012). 
Environmental movements attempt to utilize these same pathways but instead of 
acquiring political capital via economic capital, they invoke it through cultural, academic 
and (subsequent) symbolic capitals (Bourdieu [1979] 1984, [1989] 1996, [1984] 2003).  
This is to say that they foist the pedigree and prestige of the academy to legitimate the 
authority of their scientific claims (academic capital), demonstrating the damages that the 
burning of fossil fuels exerts on the planets ecological system(s) (cultural capital), and in 
turn appeal for regulatory intervention on behalf of the collective citizenry to curtail the 
malicious environmental apathy of the capitalist machine (Foster 2010; Bourdieu [1989] 
1996; Weber 1962). 
Situated within this constellation presided over by the State, but consonant with 
the diametrically opposed environmental groups and industry, is mass media.  Mass 
media operates in the geographic space between the State, these political affiliates 
(IGUs), and the public, putting it in the unique position where media narratives could 
potentially sway the zeitgeist to one side or another based on media consumption and the 
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public’s antipathy for media diversity (Simon & Xenos 2000; van Djik 1995).  The 
framing power of media outlets combined with public nepotism creates an enticing 
situation for proactive and intense encroachment on media as a SAF in an effort to 
propagate pro and anti-climate change frames for public consumption.  First, 
motivationally speaking, to continue to ossify and legitimate their field situation within 
the larger constellation of fields (reproduction of structure), and to utilize those alliances 
to perpetuate their own particular narrative (production of structure).  Likewise, the 
media is bound, as most SAFs are, by the predominant economic structural constraints 
under which all capitalist institutions must operate.  These restraints influence their 
normative culture and thus necessitate alliance building with myriad fields to collect 
source material for media narrative construction and development (Callaghan and Schnell 
2001; Cottle 2006; Fligstein and McAdam 2012).   
Capitalizing on this need, Industry utilizes their primary weapon in in 
manufacturing power: economic capital (Bourdieu [1979] 1984).  Between non-state 
fields, the propensity of this form of capital to reshape field dynamics is most powerful.  
Non-state private fields can absorb one another.  One widely researched instance of this 
is the conservative news outlet, FOX News.  Rupert Murdock (CEO) has manufactured 
an exogenous shock in the form of acquisition.  By acquiring the news media outlet, he 
was able to restructure the power dynamics of that particular subfield within mass media 
and utilizes its influence to endorse and support industry (Klein 2014; McCright and 
Dunlap 2003; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014).  This direct form of media subjugation 
is the most effective and efficient way of disseminating the industry frame for public 
consumption.  The other strategic action is the attempt to influence news media through 
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discourse propagated by corporate think tanks (another IGU in this framework) that have 
perpetuated the elite framing narrative since 1988 when several were founded in response 
to Hansen’s testimony to congress on the reality of anthropogenic climate change 
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Elsasser and Dunlap 2013; Sapinski 2015).  These 
organizations, funded directly by industry, create disparity in the perceived legitimacy of 
climate science that confirms anthropogenic climate change by employing “contrarian” 
scientists of their own directed to report contradictory findings.  The issue with this is not 
competing science, variant discourse is always present in scientific research, but with the 
intention of publishing material that directly refutes evidence for anthropogenic climate 
change.  This dissention diminishes pro-environmental groups’ influence across the 
constellation of fields.  First by eroding science’s symbolic capital thus reducing their 
effect in influencing policy.  Second, within the context of field transformation, it 
diminishes pro-environmental credibility which weakens the reproduction of the 
movement as the perception of “opportunity” to challenge industry recedes (Fligstein & 
McAdam 2012; Fligstein 2001).   
 These literatures and theories speak to the capacity of media as an agentic and 
hegemonic institution in society.  They also demonstrate the ways in which media can act 
as a figurative “stenographer” detailing the exchanges in power within and between 
institutions in society as they pivot and negotiate the exogenous shock exemplified by 
climate change.  In the next chapter, I will detail the ways in which I will interrogate 
these narratives and how they detail these volatile institutional field dynamics from 1990-
2015. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methods used in this study will be conducted to collect and analyze data to 
specifically address the questions set forth by this project: How do key print news media 
sources frame climate change?  With what forms of action and collective action frames 
institutional actors employ in response to the developing crisis of climate change?  How 
do these strategic frames evolve through time?  What role do key individual and 
institutional actors play in the precipitation of the climate change crisis, shaping its 
trajectory, and ultimately help or hinder changing field dynamics in the overall 
constellation of fields? 
To investigate these questions I will conduct a quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis of newspaper articles from two major newspaper publications from both Canada 
and the United States during the years between 1990 and 2015 (rationale for this 
particular period will be discussed later); The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal from the United States, as well as the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star from 
Canada.  I have chosen to select these particular countries as a veritable barometer for 
commitment to environmental regulation as the two dominant economic forces in North 
America (and the western hemisphere).  Additionally, these two countries have shown 
21 
 
both similar and dissimilar commitment to combatting climate change by their varying 
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, an international legally binding regulatory treaty 
intended to hold the industrial leaders of the developed world accountable for the 
management and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG).  The Kyoto Protocol 
was a highly contentious agreement that marked a decisive moment in which a rift was 
drawn among developed nations regarding appropriate climate change action.  North 
America opposed it while the rest of the developed world sought to adopt it. 
 
Pre-Analysis 
Initially, to both test the sampling strategy and coding strategy (attended to in the 
subsequent section discussing coding) I performed a pretest sampling and analysis of this 
population of articles.  In reference to the sampling, I used this as a litmus test to confirm 
the viability of this method when conducted on a larger scale.  Using a random number 
generator (http://www.random.org), I identified one article from each strata to represent 
each publication resulting in a pre-analysis sample of sixteen.  After confirming that each 
article was complete (not abridged or partial) and relevant to the topic, I concluded that 
this sampling strategy was appropriate for this project.  Subsequently, because of the size 
of the population, the sample used for pre-analysis was discarded. 
 
Sampling Strategy  
I sampled articles from The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal (US), 
and the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star (CAN).  I will use LexisNexis to locate 
articles from The New York Times (US), and the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star 
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(CAN).  Unfortunately, via LexisNexus I could not obtain full articles for The Wall Street 
Journal (US) (only abstracts) so I utilized ProQuest to supplement my sample for 
analysis.  These sources were obtained through identification by keyword searches 
focused on two particular terms: “climate change OR global warming.”  In reviewing the 
literature on studies that have conducted similar sampling techniques, I anticipated 
encountering a population of tens of thousands of news articles, a number that was 
confirmed by a preliminary search which located a population in excess of 39,000 
articles.  This number of data was strategically reduced to 802 articles.  I selected my 
sample based on two criteria suggested by the literature attending to journalistic norms: 
episode (or novelty) and personalization.  Based on a simple frequency distribution of 
these data, I separated the period into four phases, reflecting both the chronological 
phrases for distinctive dominant frames in the meta-analysis, and the proclivity for 
novelty associated with those incidents in which climate change was most salient 
demonstrated by the frequency of articles published in each year.  
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Figure 1 
 
Using these two constitutive elements of institutional media, I selected four events that 
serve as the vanguard in initiating a new potential divergence in the climate change 
narrative.  These selections focused on pivotal moments in the discourse surrounding 
climate change and the multiple dimensions and evolutions it has developed and 
undergone: (1) Dr. James Hansen’s congressional testimony in 1988 (1990) about the 
existence of anthropogenic climate change (Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, 
and Freeman 2008); (2) the Kyoto Protocol in December of 1997 and subsequent efforts 
to implement these commitments; (3) An Inconvenient Truth in 2006; (4) and the prelude 
to the twenty-first conference of parties (COP21) culminating with the decisive United 
nations conference on climate change held in Paris, winter of 2015.  Finally, once the 
population has been gathered through purposeful, relevant episodic selection, I filtered 
these data for duplicates.  A preliminary search and composition of descriptive statistics 
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aligned almost perfectly with the theoretical choices mentioned above.  The four spikes in 
media activity suggested by the literature indeed happened between 1990, 1997, 2006, 
and 2010.  So these years shall serve to distinguish four stratified sources of data to 
conduct my analysis. 
 To reduce the population size to the mark of 802 I have reproduced the systematic 
sampling strategy with a random start conducted in the pre-analysis (Babbie 2013).  After 
randomly selecting the first article, I selected an appropriate interval (every sixth, tenth, 
etc.) to reduce my sample to the target of 800 articles (Babbie 2013; Boykoff 2006; 
Boykoff and Boykoff 2007).  As mentioned previously, I chose to split the sample into 
four distinct strata.  These strata each contain (approximately) the same amount of 
articles as will the contribution of each publication to their own relative strata; 
approximately 200 and 50 respectively.  In order to achieve this I used a variable 
sampling ratio depending on the amount of articles found in each strata for each 
publication, and sampled from the search engine found in the databases.  For example, to 
attempt to collect the target number of articles for The Wall Street Journal (US) for the 
period between 1990-1996 I needed to sample every third article from the corpus of 145 
articles, resulting in a slightly less than perfect 48 articles contributing to that strata’s 
sample.  After systematically sampling the entire population in this manner I ended up 
with a final sample composed of 802 articles. 
 
Sampling Rationale 
First, these newspaper publications are ranked first and second most circulated in-
print newspapers in their respective countries.  Second, each is considered a “major” or 
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“prestige” newspaper which, in addition with exposure to a wider audience through 
circulation, has been shown to be heavily influential in crafting the media narratives of 
regional and other secondary news sources across a variety of mediums (Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2007), demonstrating their paramount importance as a force in crafting public 
opinion.  Lastly, these papers have been selected to represent varying locations on the 
political spectrum to consider how political affiliation affects the framing of media 
narratives (Boykoff 2006; Boykoff 2007; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Brossard, 
Shanahan, and McComas 2004).  This achieves two things: capturing a representative 
sample, especially given the polarization surrounding the politically contentious issue of 
climate change, or demonstrate a departure from the political polarization around climate 
change.  These factors help in the examination of the agentic-hegemonic dialectic 
intrinsic to media that is of fundamental importance in investigating a core theoretical 
subtext of this project. 
The two journalistic norms mentioned above were used to inform the sampling 
process because these journalistic norms suggest an institutional inclination for intense 
focus on a particular social issue at a particular point in time.  In other words, the more 
novel or nascent a news story, the more likely it is to receive media attention.  In the 
“negative space” of this value, a newer incident often marks a point of departure from the 
previous.  This makes the most notable news stories related to climate change to act as 
the harbinger for a new strata of analysis, as a new story (with its own spatial and 
temporal context) provides a likely point in which new discourses or themes could 
emerge.  Concordant with this logic, particularly in reference to climate change, studies 
have shown ‘spikes’ in media attention surrounding events related, inferentially or 
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directly, to the impacts of this phenomenon (Boykoff 2006; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; 
Brossard et al. 2004).   
The second norm of interest I will use to theoretically and empirically inform 
these methodological sampling choices is that of “personalization.”  Media tend to 
gravitate toward incidents that are easily ascribable to the tangible, rather than the 
abstract.  This practice of personalizing social events makes it makes it more relatable to 
the audience (Boykoff 2007; Brossard et al. 2004; Entman 1993, 2007; Lefsrud and 
Meyer 2012; Snow, Tan, and Owens 2013), this induced empathy inspires emotional 
responses of sympathy, grief, joy, fear, hate, and love.  Emotions have been shown to 
lead to better audience attention, readership, and thus ratings, feeding the economic 
motivations of institutional media (Anderson 2009; Hjarvard 2000; Schulz 2004).  As 
mentioned above, these were also chosen in coordination with the temporal arrangement 
of the three emergent dominant themes found in the comparative meta-analysis from 
1990-2010 (see aforementioned discussion in literature review for details).  As the logic 
derived from these literatures suggested, I empirically confirmed the presage incidents 
selected above by conducting a manifest content analysis using a frequency distributions 
of each publication across the selected timeframe (1990-2015).  Distinctive spikes in 
news articles were found surrounding the events chosen above.  The systematic selection 
provides a minimal risk for sampling error as the population should have no conceivable 
consistent or repeated pattern of orientation (i.e. days of the week was accounted for my 
making sure the sampling ratio was not to a factor of seven, etc.) (Babbie 2013).    
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Coding and Analysis 
I began with open coding on the framing and reasoning mechanisms, and the 
actors associated with those frames, in the journalistic material within each of the four 
newspapers.  Initial analysis of the data began by investigating multiple dimensions, such 
as “statements about climate change as a legitimate phenomenon, or not;” “how are these 
statements legitimated;” “how do these statements position key actors in relation to one 
another on the subject of climate change;” in an effort to explore and identify the framing 
strategies employed in these data (Schreier 2012).  Exhaustive sub-categories were 
identified for each of the above dimensions to better organize and interrogate these data, 
their sources, and the key actors represented in these statements (Corbin and Strauss 
2015; Schreier 2012).  I also attended to a latent evaluation of the text surrounding these 
quotes and identified themes in the discourse and language used by that newspaper 
article, looking for key common words, phrases, or narratives through a line by line 
coding of the pre-analysis sample by hand.  This provided the opportunity to uncover 
preliminary codes using dimensions derived from the deconstruction of the conclusive 
themes detailed the meta-analysis as a starting point (Schlichting 2013).  From this I was 
able to identify some preliminary codes and sub-codes of the foundational dimensions 
mentioned below (i.e. uncertainty, disbelief, and belief for the dimension of “(non)belief 
in climate change”).  Additionally, this step allowed me the opportunity to discover any 
other fundamental dimensions that emerged outside of those suggested in the literature.  
The themes constructed in the meta-analysis, and confirmed through pre-analysis, qualify 
six fundamental dimensions: (a) (non)belief in climate change; (b) perceptions of the 
attribution of climate change; (c) impacts of climate change; (d) action suggested/taken 
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by actors; (e) domination of nature; and (f) exhibitions of power between the strategic 
action fields involved.  These served the basis for analyzing the content of the main 
sample.  Coding and analysis was conducted in November and December of 2016, and 
January 2017.     
To assist with this analysis on the main sample of 802 articles, I used NVivo11 
software for organizational purposes and to help locate key words and patterns, as well as 
to craft visual aids (tables, charts, word clouds, and graphs) and to provide a manifest 
content analysis.  This introduced incipient apparent framing intentions of these nations 
and their representative newspaper publications in reference to their depiction of climate 
change, how they legitimized their position, and the key actors implicated in the data.    
A more detailed construction of latent primary themes, as well as secondary and 
tertiary nodes (sub-categories/themes) revealed the narratives that constituted the primary 
source for the final analysis (Schreier 2012).   This was achieved, with the assistance of 
NVivo11, through a reconstruction of strategic frames from the source documents via 
primary quotes (i.e. verbatim statements from the data) related to the aforementioned 
deductively constructed key dimensions.  Based on these selected quotes, inductive frame 
analysis of these quotes was conducted to isolate and construct thematic media narratives 
over time within each newspaper publication, paying particular attention to the most 
salient themes and the actors implicated within them.  In addition to identifying key 
indicative statements, the primary and secondary actors implicated by association within 
the data was analyzed.  The year of each article was noted for temporal consideration.   
After I identified key dimensions, the discourse associated with each, the sub-
categories and their subsequent themes within each of the newspapers, I compared these 
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findings and noted any distinctive differences or similarities within and between these 
publications by political lean and nationality, followed by a similar comparison between 
nations from 1990-2015.  Once the analysis of the media narratives was conducted and 
the framing strategies were identified I organized them a second time according to actors 
contributing to those narratives and the institutions that they represent (Van Gorp 2009 as 
cited in Schlichting 2013).  These analyses allowed for the distinction and coupling of 
institutions through relationships and interactions between actors.   
The focus of the forthcoming analysis chapter is presented in two phases which 
attend to two main points of consideration.  The first is a presentation of the data 
chronologically organized along two thematic analytical categories: dominant climate 
change narratives and institutional relationships.  The discussion section mirrors the 
organization of the findings section.  It centers first on reinforcing past research on 
dominant narratives as found in these data and then highlights departures from research 
on the evolution of climate change discourse (Boykoff 2013; Schlichting 2013).  This is 
followed by an analysis of the most dominant institutions that contribute to that discourse 
and how they strategically interact with other fields to enhance those narratives.  It should 
be noted that these interactions are only part of a very elaborate and complex structure of 
institutional engagements.  Additionally, they highlight the most dominant narratives and 
interactions through time.  These analyses do not presume to capture all of the discursive 
narratives or interactions of all institutional actors, as disconfirmatory evidence can be 
found throughout the data, but only that the presentation of these data and its analyses are 
indicative of the most prominent narratives and interactions shown to have the most 
profound effect on collective action responding to climate change.  More nuanced 
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temporal analysis would demonstrate a more discursive character of these narratives and 
interactions and should be a subject for future study.   
Synthesized depictions of recurrent frames and institutional relationships from the 
data will serve as the primary presentation of themes. Additionally, actual quotes by 
actors within the source material will capture exemplary participation and engagement 
with these themes.  All articles cited will appear in the table found in APPENDIX I and 
the verbatim excerpts from exemplars are displayed in APPENDIX II to provide 
appropriate context for my analysis of this text.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis chapter will be organized into two sections.  The first presents the 
findings analyzed from the data followed by a discussion section.  The findings will 
synthesize the relevant article tone, climate change discourse, and institutional 
relationships chronologically to demonstrate how these three dimensions evolve through 
time.  The discussion section will interpret these syntheses and present their relevance 
within the context of relevant literature. 
 
FINDINGS 
The basic findings of this research unfolds in three distinct parts.  The first 
captures the inferential framing context that print news media sources implement 
regarding perceptions of the reality of climate change.  Next, I discuss the dominant and 
contributing framing strategies of particular actors and institutions in historical order.  
Finally, I present the position, relative position, and changes in the orientation of 
intuitions which are of central importance to the evolution of climate change discourse 
and subsequent action taken in response to this problem.  These orientations are 
significant in understanding, constructing, and tracking the position and trajectory of 
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institutions relative to climate change action within the larger context of the constellation 
of fields.  To accomplish this I attend to the following research questions: How do key 
print news media sources frame climate change?  With what forms of action and 
collective action frames institutional actors employ in response to the developing crisis of 
climate change?  How do these strategic frames evolve through time?  What role do key 
individual and institutional actors play in the precipitation of the climate change crisis, 
shaping its trajectory, and ultimately help or hinder changing field dynamics in the 
overall constellation of fields? 
"Climate change, which threatens to render all human projects irrelevant; 
which presents us with detailed evidence of our lack of understanding of 
the world we inhabit while, at the same time, demonstrating that we are 
still entirely reliant upon it. Climate change, which highlights in painful 
colour the head-on crash between civilisation (sic) and 'nature'; which 
makes plain, more effectively than any carefully constructed argument or 
optimistically defiant protest, how the machine's need for permanent 
growth will require us to destroy ourselves in its name. Climate change, 
which brings home at last our ultimate powerlessness" (The New York 
Times, July 27, 2014). 
 
Media Framing  
The first point of concern regarding using print news media as a medium for 
studying climate change discourse propagated by institution actors is potential differences 
in those publications characterization of climate change.  The trend in all 802 observation 
points clearly show consistency, across all print news sources regardless of political 
affiliation, in each publications’ sentiment towards the issue of climate change.  While 
the language used in reference to the phenomenon and its symptomatic phenomena is 
used somewhat arbitrarily, a noticeable transition has emerged over time.  “Global 
warming” was the preferred word choice in the early 1990s with “climate change” taking 
over as the dominant semantic reference to the phenomenon during and after the Kyoto 
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negotiations. It remains the most prominent language choice in public discourse 
pertaining to this issue. The tone of each article was assigned to one of three categories 
indicating if that article operated under the presupposition that 1) climate change is 
happening; 2) a balanced approach in which articles presented both arguments and 
sentiments for and against climate change as real; 3) climate change is not occurring.  
Although articles ranged across all three categories, they were by no means equally 
represented.  Overwhelmingly, the tone of all print news sources reported the chosen 
story under the contextual presupposition that climate change is a reality with an average 
of approximately 26 per publication (just over 50% of each sample in each quartile).   
Longitudinally, there were slight shifts in the utterance level analysis of each 
article.  Those articles that assumed the non-existence of climate change generally grew 
less frequent from each period to the next (1990-1996, 1997-2004, 2005-2010, and 2011-
2015).  The difference between the greatest and least number of occurrences conveying a 
sense of “anti-climate change” between publications in any time period was 10 (11 in The 
Globe and Mail 1997-2004 and a single article in The New York Times 2011-2015).  
This maximum range represents 20% of the total articles in the sample size for each 
publication in each period (n=50).  This finding suggests the presence of trends contrary 
to those found in other analyses of print news media as a means of studying the public 
discourse surrounding climate change (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Callaghan and 
Schnell 2001; and Lefsrud and Meyer 2012). Here, analyses of these data suggests that 
media frames politically contentious subjects objectively.  Communications framing 
research often finds media sources provide a balanced approach to reporting, presenting 
both sides of an argument equally.  Generally framing climate change as a reality 
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corroborates the notion of “media agency.”  Demonstrating media’s ability to selectively 
frame an issue divorced from elite hegemonies (Altheide 1984; Anderson 2009; Boykoff 
2007; and Brossard, Shanahan, and McComas 2004). 
 
Figure 2 
Also of note, these presuppositions toward characterizing climate change as reality occur 
regardless of political lean or country of origin.  In other words, there was very little 
distinguishable difference in the tone from the Wall Street Journal or The Globe & Mail 
(self-identified conservative publications from the United States and Canada 
respectively) to that found in The New York Times or Toronto Star (self-identified liberal 
publications).  To a smaller degree, The Wall Street Journal did provide a more balanced, 
or uncertain, position on climate change, but over time all four publications generally 
avoided positioning themselves as unsupportive of climate change.    
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The Evolution in Climate Change Media Discourse 
As pertinent literature asserts, the prevalence of print news articles on a particular 
subject change in concert with important historical events.  Events that served as the 
primarily basis for print news media construction of climate change followed four major 
events: the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol negotiations (and 
subsequent attempts at conformation) in 1996 through the early to mid-2000s, Al Gore’s 
An Inconvenient Truth in 2006, and the 21st Conference of Parties climate change 
negotiations in 2015.  While these events dominated the news cycle in terms of salience 
and subject matter, other ancillary events were also notable.  These include numerous 
climate negotiations such as Copenhagen in 2009, Cancun in 2010, and the US-China 
emissions commitment in 2014.  It is apparent that political events, in particular, 
dominated the print news media discourse.  However, when gaps between coverage of 
socio-political events pertaining to climate change appeared, science dominated the 
headlines.  Case after case presents the evidence of climate change (i.e., scientific 
research on environmental changes). 
 The sample of print news media was primarily constituted by full articles with 
editorials contributing approximately one fifth of observations to the total sample.  These 
editorials were most often composed by individual primary actors belonging to two 
specific institutional fields: industry and academia (“primary” in this case should be read 
as those with credentialed authority e.g., a CEO or PhD, respectively).  Interestingly, the 
framing strategy employed by these actors was not focused on the reality of climate 
change or the legitimacy of the science supporting that reality.  In fact, other than The 
Wall Street Journal, oppositional frames rarely appear at all.  Rather, these actors assume 
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climate change as a reality.  Nearly 82% of framing strategies regarding perceptions of 
climate change affirm its existence.  This majority is further enhanced by an additional 
4% of frames displaying apathy to its existence.  In other words, actors employing the 
apathy frame were not concerned with climate change, or its potential negative impact on 
the environment.  In contrast, only 4% of cases in which actors discussed the reality of 
climate change outright denied its existence.  Based on the historical distribution of these 
cases, no visible trend appears.  This type of discourse has remained steady as frames of 
climate change disbelief are found with consistency, in both content and frequency, 
throughout observations sampled within the 1990-2015 timeframe.  Surprisingly, those 
actors assert that if they are wrong about the existence of climate change, there would be 
profound negative and detrimental effects (The Toronto Star, September 8, 2008).  Not 
only environmentally, but economically as well.  Those who make this concession 
constitute a substantial population those disbelievers (33%) and more interestingly still, 
all of these assertions were made by scientists.  These statements occur early in the 
sample (in the first five year time period) and are nearly all made in reference to the same 
study about environmental change.  These studies are conducted on micro phenomena 
which scientists caution are not indicators affirming the existence of climate change, but 
collectively could demonstrate its effects (The Globe & Mail, August 4, 1994).  In the 
wake of these statements, industry and state actors often seize an opportunity to cast 
doubt on the existence of climate change and challenge the legitimacy of science in 
providing adequate and reliable information from which policy makers can make 
decisions to act on climate change.  Similarly, when scientists or scientific panels such as 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a correction of previous 
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data, methods, or evidence, they were derogated by anti-climate change advocates (The 
Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2010).  Exploitation of the nature of science as an 
iterative and etiologically uncertain process is a common tactic employed by politicians 
and industry representatives in order to cite a logical basis for forestalling action on 
climate change.  “Scientific uncertainty” is one of the most commonly implemented 
strategies for this inaction and is the dominant frame in the first historical time period of 
this study.   
In the years following Kyoto, the strategy shifts to the “socio-economic” 
narrative.  This remains the dominant standpoint of stakeholders advising no action on 
climate change throughout the final 20 years of the study (1996-2015).  Broadly, this 
narrative almost entirely abandons the position of climate change disbelief and instead 
focuses on the economic ramifications of instituting policy to combat climate change.  
These sponsors argue that suggested action on climate change, including but not limited 
to: stricter regulations on carbon emissions, carbon taxes, government subsidies or tax 
incentives for alternative “green” energy sources, conservation efforts, and carbon 
trading/tradable emissions permits, constitute an unconscionable and irresponsible set of 
measures that would have devastating effects on economic growth and prosperity (The 
Globe & Mail, July 21, 2001).  Building on the conceptual mission established during the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, in the years following Kyoto, more than 150 countries 
have been attempting to adopt a more substantial, both in terms of commitment and 
impact, international agreement toward combatting the dangers of rising greenhouse 
emissions.  Particularly those created by industrialized nations.  Due to fossil fuels being 
the dominant and globally pervasive form of energy production, regulation was 
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anticipated to affect “every conceivable interest group.”  In response to this threat, a 
coalition of fossil fuel advocates composed of producers, labor unions, and related 
industries, starkly opposed these government restrictions1 (The New York Times, 
December 7, 1997). 
 Complementing this narrative is a return to the notion of scientific uncertainty and 
questions of legitimacy surrounding climate change research, particularly in the first 
historical period of this study.  Following Kyoto, the supplementary legitimation of the 
socio-economic narrative largely departs from questioning the science and instead argues 
for competitive geo-politics. The first contention is the exclusion of the majority of less-
developed countries from the Kyoto agreement.  The United States and Canada also 
contend that Kyoto will impact European countries far less than their North American 
counterparts citing post Second World War reconstruction efforts which focused on 
newer technologies as well as English political action to divest in coal power during the 
1980s.  Such measures put these nations in a far better position to conform to the Kyoto 
agreement due to their relative distance from fossil fuel dependence.  By 2005 the 
narrative adds criticism of governance as the primary facilitator impacting the looming 
threat of climate change.  Instead industry allies suggest an alternative approach.  In 
contrast to regulatory action, which would inhibit economic prosperity, they recommend 
neoliberal, market based solutions (The Globe & Mail, Oct 26, 2002).  This rationale 
suggests that by allowing natural, uninhibited market forces via technological innovation 
and development to organically transition to cleaner energy production and use, 
developed nations can use economic growth as the primary driver for climate change 
remediation.  Historical analysis of these data have demonstrated ineffectiveness of 
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voluntary action.  Specifically, the Canadian national government permitted industry to 
voluntarily approach the issue of reconciling Kyoto’s targets with economic production.  
In Ottawa, a decade long national report, compiled by a variety of different government 
agencies, unanimously found no significant change in carbon dioxide emissions over that 
time period concluding that the “voluntary approach and limited incentives [are] not 
sufficient to drive substantive change."  Instead, policy makers "need more consideration 
of regulation and taxation to drive behavioural [sic] change and technology deployment 
and uptake"2 (The Globe & Mail, January 11, 2005).  Furthermore, despite the scientific 
consensus on climate change and the ominous threat that this problem poses to the 
sustainability of the planet, as well as human civilization, industry interests have 
remained a priority.  To explore this I turn to the power dynamics apparent through the 
interactions of key institutions in news print media. 
  
Institutional Field Relationships 
Although this project’s primary theoretical focus is on the interactions and power 
dynamics between institutional actors (i.e., the state, the academy, industry, media, 
NGOs, etc.) print media discourse also focused on individual actors acting on behalf of 
these institutions.  The most dominant institutions represented in these data were that of 
the state and industry.  Prominent actors representing these institutions included US 
presidents (George H. W. Bush, 1989-1993; Bill Clinton, 1993-2001; George W. Bush, 
2001-2009; and Barack Obama, 2009-2017), Canadian Prime Ministers (Jean Chrétien, 
1993-2003; Paul Martin, 2003-2006; Stephen Harper, 2006-2015; Justin Trudeau 2015-
present), congressional and parliament representatives, state governors and provincial 
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premiers, energy administrators/ministers, scientists, Al Gore, and those with fossil fuel 
industry affiliations.  When I interrogate the data with the purpose of situating the 
historical positioning of actors, the names of both state institutions and individual actors 
were mentioned by the source material.  These individual/group distinctions were made 
depending on the context of the article or situation presented.  For example, if the article 
discussed the relationship between nations, or nations with the larger international 
governmental community (United Nations, Earth Summit, Kyoto, etc.), the institution 
was most often referenced, especially when the situation was politically contentious or 
oppositional3.  This was also the practice when print news media referenced adherence to 
a traditional political position, economic policy, environmental policy, etc. of a nation or 
state/province.  In contrast, when a departure from traditional nation-state policy appears, 
the print news media attributes responsibility for these divergences to individual actors 
rather than the country they represent: 
China has long argued that it should not have to commit to cutting carbon 
pollution, since its energy consumption helped fuel the rise of its poor rural 
population to the middle class. But Mr. Xi [President of the Peoples Republic of 
China] has laid out a strategy of economic growth that is not directly tied to fossil 
fuel consumption, in hopes that his country could begin to decouple economic 
growth from carbon emissions (The New York Times, November 13, 2014).  
 
However, this occurs primarily for representatives of the state (in its multitude of scalar 
manifestations).  Industry actors retain a noticeable degree of anonymity, and therefore 
relative invisibility, throughout the historical timeframe of these analyses.  Print news 
media sources did not name these agents specifically.  Instead, individual and 
institutional industry actors are most often categorized into largely ambiguous categories 
such as “business owners,” “lobbyists for corporations,” “industry affiliates,” etc.  
Furthering this notion of invisibility, these groups are inferentially treated as community 
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constituents.  This is the case particularly in Canada, where they frame resistance to 
acting on climate change as hurting the Canadian citizenry and their communities rather 
than industry interests.  Much of the data in the late 1990s and early 2000s implicitly tied 
industry resistance with community resistance.  Utilizing strategies of “othering,” 
government officials and industry actors from Alberta and Ontario used similar rhetoric 
that represented industry goals as community priorities.  While government officials 
vehemently denied corporate influence, they intentionally subsumed and linked industry 
interests within community identity, making action toward industry an affront on the 
community4.  This invisibility is particularly evident when referencing institutional 
industry actors who stand to bear the greatest burden and impact from regulatory action 
on climate change, such as fossil fuel and automotive industries.   
As time progresses, industry actors lose some of that anonymity as the fossil fuel 
and automotive industries get loosely branded and receive consistent incorporation in 
media discourse.  Particularly when they are opposed to action on climate change.  The 
final five years of data sees explicit company names (i.e. Exxon Mobil, British 
Petroleum, Shell, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and other constituents of the energy industry 
being the most common) referenced with regularity.  Specific mention of individuals 
does not happen until the final years of analysis in which the Koch brothers and Koch 
Industries are specifically identified as patrons and benefactors of anti-climate change 
lobbying efforts, as well as political campaign contributions to lawmakers who oppose 
action on climate change5. 
 Although, these incidences are the most ostensible examples of the intimate and 
intense relationship between industry and the state, other implicit and inferential 
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examples appear throughout the print news media discourse to reinforce the presence of 
this relationship.  Here, when we interrogate particular references in these articles, we 
find the greatest incidences of exercises of power as well as alliance building and 
maintenance from these two constituents: industry and state institutions.  Interactions 
involving these two make up the majority of all interactions within and between 
institutions (65.6%).   
 
Figure 3 
  
Additionally, making up 22% of all interactions between institutions (when compared 
with NGO-state interactions which form the next most populated category at 7%), 
industry and state power dynamics constitute the largest such institutional 
relationship/interaction.  Based on this data, the institutions of industry and the state form 
the nexus through which perceptions and policy/action on climate change predominantly 
take shape.  More importantly, these findings suggest that as the most active sites for 
Total Interactions Within & Between Fields
Academy Industry State MLTA MGNO NGO Media
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activity, state-industry interactions also likely weigh most heavily into the decision 
making process about climate change in the United States and Canada. 
 Exchanges between state and industry fields occur with considerable consistency 
and in a variety of capacities that evolve through time.  Industry uses a variety of 
strategic actions to influence nation-state constituents and elicit non-action on climate 
change.  The first, and most obvious of these relationships is that of corporate lobbying 
groups and reactionary coalitions that obstructed environmental legislation.  This 
occurred in spite of public opinion which supported these measures6.  This was by far the 
most common, and perhaps effective, relationship that preserved industry interests.  By 
preventing and endorsing climate-negligent legislation.  Effective not only because they 
circumvented public opinion and global initiatives designed to combat climate change, 
but also in the frustration that this caused within pro-environmental groups.  Indeed, 
momentum in social movements is an important element.  As their efforts were stymied 
and corporate influence in politics grew, the budgets and memberships of some 
environmental groups began to fall6.  The reverberations of these frustrations were felt 
within state institutions as well.  In December 2012, Lisa Jackson, Administrator of the 
EPA, stepped down as head of the agency due to congressional intransigence inspired by 
corporate lobbyists and the Obama administration’s perceived imminent move to support 
the Keystone pipeline7.  The fossil fuel industry also made a concerted effort to infiltrate 
the United States government to maintain their power and capitalize on convenient 
economic and political circumstances.  This effort was calculated, strategic, prolific, and 
extensive:  
As Shell surveyed the political landscape ahead of the 2008 presidential 
election, its lobbyists compiled a thick planning book for dealing with the 
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three likeliest winners, ranking them in order of predicted finish. First was 
Hillary Rodham Clinton, followed by John McCain. Last was Barack 
Obama. 
Shell retained the retired senators John B. Breaux, Democrat of Louisiana, 
and Trent Lott, Republican of Mississippi, to lobby Mrs. Clinton and Mr. 
McCain. 
Approaching Mr. Obama, with far less history in Washington, took more 
creativity. One top Obama adviser who offered some hope to Shell was 
Mr. Obama's Senate chief of staff, Pete Rouse. With family roots in 
Alaska and experience as an aide to the state's Republican lieutenant 
governor, Mr. Rouse understood the importance of oil to Alaska's 
economy and knew the politics of oil and the Senate. He eventually 
became the White House point man on Arctic drilling. 
A more unlikely campaign aide destined to play a significant role was Ms. 
Zichal, Senator John Kerry's former legislative director. Her first trip to 
Washington had been as a college student and an advocate for the Alaska 
Wilderness League, lobbying against drilling in the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge. 
The 2008 campaign played out amid near-record gasoline prices. The 
Bush administration and the McCain campaign pushed for lifting the 
Congressional moratorium on most offshore drilling, and Republican 
campaign rallies were punctuated by cries of ''Drill, baby, drill'' (The New 
York Times, May 24, 2012). 
 
Actions by corporate representatives were also reactionary, whether refuting or seeking to 
devalue scientific evidence warning governments of climate change, or through the 
formation of coalitions to confront the threat of regulatory action.  These latter efforts 
were also proactive by directly financially contributing to the congressional campaigns of 
anti-climate change advocates.  Commitment to both preparation and reaction is 
substantial as Shell alone employs over three dozen lobbyists (according to government 
disclosure records obtained by The New York Times).  Beyond persons employed, Shell 
made large financial contributions lobbying against climate change; $4.5 million in 2008 
(the Bush administrations last year in office), $10.2 million in 2009, $10.4 million in 
2010, and $14.8 million in 2011.   
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While primarily confronting climate change sympathizers, fossil fuel industries 
also attempted to earn their trust.  ExxonMobil and Shell, fearing president-elect 
Obama’s potential cuts to fossil fuel subsidies and the introduction of climate change 
legislation, joined the United States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP).  This was a 
new tactic in which industry could gain access to top policy makers and even the 
president by superficially advocating for a pro-environment response to climate change: 
“It helped people look at us differently and open doors,” Mr. Odum (the Shell affiliate 
which joined USCAP) said. “I do not think there is any doubt about that” (The New York 
Times, May 24, 2012).  Industry followed the action regardless of who the decision 
makers were or the forums where climate change was discussed.  Travelling to the Kyoto 
Protocol climate change negotiations to apply direct pressure to decision makers, Senator 
Joseph Liebermann recalled in a telephone interview with The New York Times, "It is as 
if a large chunk of the lobbying community from the capital has been transported from 
Washington to Kyoto for two weeks"8 (The New York Times, December 7, 1997). 
These anti-climate change coalitions were first formed after Dr. James Hansen’s 
1988 congressional testimony in which he presented his findings on the reality of 
anthropogenic climate change.  Corporate think tanks such as the Global Climate 
Coalition were formed to present scientific findings that refuted climate change research 
and created an air of uncertainty about the legitimacy of the science.  Effectively, this 
stymied governmental intervention which bases its policy decisions on scientific experts.  
These coalitions were a collective constituted by a variety of institutions including: 
industry, non-profit organizations, academia, and the media.  By funding legislators, 
pooling resources, and sponsoring climate change denial, a complementary and indirect 
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exercise of power takes shape.  Industry exerts additional influence on the state by 
coordinating with, and mediating their efforts through, other institutions.  Proponents of 
these denial narratives were nearly never mentioned individually, however, the 
reoccurring presence of one particular individual provided an interesting example of the 
formulation of this discourse.  Rex Murphy, CBC Radio and The National media 
commentator, was one of the only salient voices to challenge the data and scientific 
consensus on climate change in Canada.   
I am under no illusion about the force of the global warming consensus.  
It is the grand orthodoxy of our day. Among right-thinking people, the 
idea of expressing any doubts on some of its more cataclysmic projections, 
to speak in tones other than those of veneration about its high-priests, such 
as Mr. Suzuki or Al Gore, is to stir a response uncomfortably close to what 
in previous and less rational times was reserved for blasphemers, heretics 
and atheists.  
 But wherever we are on global warming, and on the models and theories 
supporting it, it is not yet The Truth, nor is it yet Science (with a capital S) 
as such. And to put a stay on our full consent to its more clamorous and 
particular alarms is not, pace Dr. Suzuki, either "ignoring science" or 
complicity in criminal endeavour (sic). Nor is reasoned dissent or dispute, 
on some or all of the policy recommendations that global warming 
advocates insist flow, as night follows day, from their science. –Rex 
Murphy, Commentator with The National and host of CBC Radio's Cross-
Country Checkup (The Globe & Mail, February 16, 2008). 
 
Not only did his frame appear empirically in editorials, but was referenced secondarily by 
reports found in full articles.  This flippant, facetious, and patronizing tone was a 
common rhetorical device among similar social commentators in the United States who 
adamantly disagreed with, or refused to acknowledge, the scientific consensus on climate 
change.  Coupled with this strategy, hyperbole and sarcasm sensationalized and 
summarily dismissed the predicted social, economic, or most often, environmental effects 
of this problem.   
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 While consistently employed by industry affiliates throughout the history of these 
data, the dominance of the “scientific uncertainty” pathos gave way to the new strategic 
frame of “socio-economic consequences” in the mid-1990s.  This changed the landscape 
of field interactions.  Preserved and constrained in an air of intransigence through 
lobbying and election campaign contributions, the lack of action by the United States and 
Canada facilitated a reaction by pro-environmental nations.  A new type of inter-State 
conflict emerged.  Motivated by the binding mutual commitments called for by the Kyoto 
agreement, a variety of state actors’ exerted pressure on the United States and Canada to 
implement meaningful legislative regulatory action.  These political pressures take shape 
through both interstate and intrastate pathways of power.  The first is demonstrated by 
interactions of two international state institutional actors that follow a binary 
categorization with economic development serving as the criteria by which lines are 
drawn.  The first of these is a coalition of less-developed, or periphery, countries from the 
“Global South.”  Employing the narrative discussed earlier, the “Group of 77” (g77), use 
global climate negotiations from Rio in 1992 to Paris in 2015 as a venue to plead their 
case to the developed world.  In taking responsibility for and acknowledging that their 
process of development is not conducive to combatting climate change, while 
simultaneously blaming the “global North” for excessive consumption as well as 
outsourcing dirty production practices to the “South”, they pressure developed nations to 
finance their green development.     
Due to their reputation, the United States often bears the brunt of international 
criticism.  Unfortunately, the United States is often the fulcrum upon which international 
action on climate change pivots.  President George H. W. Bush began the trend by 
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threatening an American hold out from the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 unless Agenda 
21 was taken off the table.  Agenda 21 was a provision that would have set binding limits 
to how much atmospheric carbon dioxide developed nations could emit.  Despite pressure 
from 148 other countries and environmental groups like Greenpeace USA, the first Bush 
administration refused to attend unless Agenda 21 was removed from the summit’s 
agenda.  They claimed it would hurt the economic self-interests of the United States (The 
Globe & Mail, March 30, 1992)9.  Similar anti-climate change sentiment can be seen with 
more recent presidencies.  President Barack Obama, widely considered one of our most 
environmentally conscious presidents, decided to open the arctic to offshore oil drilling 
only months after the British Petroleum Deep Horizon oil spill.  Excited by the prospect 
of decreasing American dependence on foreign oil, President Obama consented in part 
due to Shell’s reassurances that the proposed low pressure, relatively shallow wells 
proposed for use in arctic waters did not represent the same environmental risk that BP’s 
high-pressure well did.  A well that exploded and released over 130 million gallons of oil 
into the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.  EPA commissioners close to the president recalled that 
the president’s mere mention of drilling in the arctic while the country was still reeling 
from the BP disaster signaled to them that “Shell’s audacious plan to drill in waters 
previously considered untouchable had gone from improbable to inevitable”10.  
Unfortunately, Canada often uses the United States as a barometer for their own 
commitment to environmental regulation.  This appears to be a strategy motivated by the 
preservation of an amiable political and economic relationship with Canada’s closest 
neighbor and principal trade partner11 12.  Article after article emphasized the lock step 
relationship between Canadian and American environmental policy. 
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 The European Union represents the antithesis of this anti-climate change 
sentiment and have consistently applied political pressure to the United States over the 
course of this study.  Whether it be direct means of pressuring North America to take 
action on climate change through proposing a binding commitment to limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions at the Earth Summit in Rio 1992, symbolically condemning 
American inaction by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, or leading through example by 
divesting from fossil fuels and subsidizing renewable and sustainable sources of energy, 
Europe is depicted in news print media as the global standard of environmental 
progressivism.  The most prominent direct exercise of power from Europe has been on 
Canadian accountability to Kyoto.  Following US reluctance to invest in alternative 
energy due to the wealth of oil found in provinces like Alberta, Canada sought to 
negotiate “carbon trading” provisions in order to meet their Kyoto commitments.  
Essentially, these would permit Canada to continue their rate of greenhouse gas 
emissions (instead of the Kyoto recommendation to reduce them 15% below 1990 
emissions levels).  In exchange, Canada suggested an alternative.  The combination of 
two pro-environmental actions: (1) legislation that would preserve vast Canadian forests 
as a carbon “sink” (preservation of trees has been shown to absorb large amounts of 
carbon from the atmosphere) and (2) receiving carbon credits toward these emissions 
targets by selling clean(er) energy to the US.  The European Union was highly resistant to 
this proposal suggesting that Canada was attempting to sidestep its commitment to 
Kyoto.  Additionally, if Europe could persuade Canada to institute meaningful policy 
toward a serious reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, the EU might be able to exploit 
the Canadian-American relationship and coerce the United States into taking action13.  
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At the conclusion of this study an interesting and compelling dynamic emerges in 
the power relations between industry and state institutions in the US.  Industry solidarity 
begins to dissolve and fragment.  Energy giants like Shell and Exxon Mobil begin to 
transition away from reinvestment in oil infrastructure and begin to diversify and finance 
the development of greener fuel sources, specifically natural gas.  These actions signify 
that the long term financial goals for these companies do not necessarily lie in the 
traditional markets dominated by coal and oil.  Exxon Mobil has even explicitly 
consented to the reality of climate change (The Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2015).  
Not just a natural phenomenon, but as an anthropogenic one linked to human activities.  
Additionally, companies like Walmart and others (27 in total) have changed their long-
term investment strategies to account for perceived carbon taxes and other forms of 
government intervention.  This stands in stark contrast to Koch Industries which 
maintains its long held stance and financial support for congressional candidates that are 
fiercely opposed to the science (and legislation)14.  Despite this shift in industry ideology 
and practice, conservative politicians, traditional advocates and allies of these industries, 
are maintaining (and perhaps ossifying) their positions of climate denial and political 
obstinacy.  No longer employing the “scientific uncertainty” narrative, and assailed by 25 
years of research affirming and reinforcing the reality of climate change, these 
conservative ideologues refuse to acknowledge science at all.  “I’m not a scientist” 
becomes a new conservative party slogan 14. 
After presenting the most important results of the analyses of these data, I now 
turn to discuss the interpretation and relevance of these findings. 
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DISCUSSION 
These findings underscore the complexity of climate change as a societal 
problem.  More specifically, it highlights the entangled nature of political, social, and 
economic structures that are reproduced and reinforced through time. These structures are 
substantiated and legitimated by cultural conventions and ideological systems that serve 
as the foundation of these structures.  These structures, and the cultural and ideological 
edifices which legitimize them, extend across a macro, meso, and micro levels of 
analysis.  The problem of climate change is a macro-level collective issue, as is the 
international institutions often charged with proposing solutions (i.e., the Earth Summit, 
the UN, or Kyoto), but the implications of these decisions focus on the relationships 
between actors and constituents at meso and micro levels.   These relationships add 
considerable complexity to the problem of climate change.  These transcendent 
complications further inhibit and forestall consensus and coalition building (Parks and 
Roberts 2010).  From this spatially elaborate vantage point, field theory provides an 
appropriate temporal accommodation to, and means of visualizing, the multi-scalar 
interaction and integration of two sociological traditions which consider structural 
inequality on one hand, and symbolic exchange on the other.  
 The following section will discuss first, print media framing strategies, starting 
with an utterance level interpretation of media tone.  Next, I will discuss the narratives of 
“scientific uncertainty,” and “socio-economic consequences” (Schlichting 2013) and the 
implications and actors advocating for these anti-climate change narratives.  Next, I will 
discuss the relationships within and between fields, charting how these relationships have 
changed over time, and the implications of these changes in position and relative position 
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in the overall context of field dynamics, elucidating key relationships and trajectories that 
could provide a key indication of the future position of these fields and field actors. 
 
Strategically Framing Climate Change  
 Viewing the longitudinal progression and discursive evolution detailing the ways 
in which different actors regard climate change within fields is crucial in accounting for 
the strategic positioning of institutional fields in relation to one another through time.  
Contingently, it is also imperative to establish how dominant groups project the 
disposition of their field to other proximate fields.  With these considerations in mind, it 
is perhaps most important to identify the strategic purpose for this position taking.  The 
relative positions of fields are representative of the goals of those particular fields and 
thus, representative of dominant groups within those fields (Bourdieu 1984, 2007; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; and Parks and Roberts 
2010).  Climate change represents an exogenous shock or opportunity to upset these 
balances in power dynamics within and between fields.  Here, it is possible to interpret 
the action proposed by actors as an indicator of position within a field.  In other words, 
do these positions, designated by suggested action, represent a reproduction of the status 
quo or a change in relations within and between fields?  The corresponding interpretation 
indicates whether someone is in power (preserving the status quo) or is seeking it 
(transformative field dynamics). 
 Surprisingly, and contrary to a large contingent of literature on media framing 
(Carragee and Roefs 2004; Entman 2007; Simon and Xenos 2000; and Snow, Tan, and 
Owens 2013), the initial framing of climate change was tacitly considered a reality in the 
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majority of the articles sampled in this study, departing from dominant narratives found 
in elite discourse (Boykoff 2006; Boykoff 2013; and Schlicting 2013).  This trend persists 
and actually, with the exception of The Wall Street Journal, grows through time (see 
Figure 2).  Here, The Wall Street Journal stands alone as the only publication which does 
not trend towards adopting support for climate change as a reality.  Instead, they remain 
consistent in their stance over time, and while the articles sampled from The Wall Street 
Journal do feature a larger proportion of articles which deny the existence of climate 
change compared with the other three publications, those articles appear with less 
frequency than either “pro-climate change” or “climate change skeptic” articles.  This 
corroborates research that finds political affiliation is the strongest indicator of 
perceptions of climate change (Farrell 2015a; Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008; 
McCright and Dunlap 2003; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014), but only when 
considering United States sources.  The Globe & Mail, the most widely distributed 
conservative printed newspaper in Canada, shows no such trend and follows The New 
York Times and The Toronto Star toward supporting a stance on climate change as a 
reality.   
 
Scientific uncertainty 
However, when moving beyond the utterance level of each article to consider the 
ways that social and political actors contribute to the overall conversation on climate 
change these polarities reappear.  In more detail, Schlichtings (2013) meta-analysis on 
elite climate change discourse is consistent with this study’s findings in that the first 
dominant narrative conservative politicians and industry sponsors adopt is that of 
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“scientific uncertainty.”  Through a variety of fields, these groups (i.e., state, industry, 
and NGO being the most common) utilized a number of strategies to dismantle the 
legitimacy of the academic/scientific institution.  The first and most subtle of approaches 
was emphasizing the nascent nature of the scientific findings which point to climate 
change as a likely reality.  Here, from within state fields, proponents of this narrative 
argue that more research should be completed before action is taken.  A variety of sub-
narratives contribute to this larger assertion: (1) there is not enough data to support the 
reality of climate change, more needs to be completed; (2) the system is too complex to 
observe and thus fully understand; (3) the scientific community is in disagreement on the 
existence of climate change.  Ultimately, these individual and institutional actors suggest 
that climate change is an undetermined reality, precluding decision makers from acting, 
which reproduces status quo power dynamics and current positions within and between 
fields.  This strategy is not unique to the issue of climate change.  Similar constructed 
frames and strategic action were employed by the tobacco industry when health concerns 
arose around the use of their products (Parks and Roberts 2010).  The intersection of 
climate change and smoking at the issue of public health, and thus a potential example of 
how public health concerns can be used to influence governmental policy and public 
perception, were frequently compared.  An excerpt from the following article serves as an 
example of this:   
''In the end, smoking became unacceptable. That was not a legal statement. 
It was a social statement, and consensus was broad and has held for a long 
time,'' Mr. Holtz-Eakin [economic policy advisor] said. ''Maybe you get 
there on carbon emissions, but right now, this is an issue for the elites.'' 
Though there are significant differences between the fights over coal and 
tobacco, the numerous parallels offer a potential road map to a settled 
peace. The burning of both causes adverse health effects. The affected 
regions overlap in Kentucky, Virginia and North Carolina, and they are 
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similarly struggling. (Wyoming, the No. 1 coal producer, did not have a 
stake in the tobacco fight.) For years, the producers of both have denied 
and funded the denial of what a vast majority of scientists agree on: the 
damaging results of the products' use (The New York Times, June 4, 2014). 
 
These similarities in industry counter-movements suggests that delegitimizing science is 
the first tactic against social reform that challenges current economic and political 
institutions of power.  This could be a considerable point in further research on social 
movements which intend to challenge these structures.    
These findings reinforce McCright and Dunlap’s (2010) work on what they refer 
to as “anti-reflexivity,” which highlights Lukes (1974) theorem on dimensions of power, 
a dynamic that is largely ignored (or at least marginalized) in reflexive modernization 
theory.  Agents of conservativism focus primarily on Lukes (1974) second dimension of 
power.  This suggests that political actors constrain the lens through which decision 
making occurs to focus only on those issues which support, or at very least fail to 
challenge, the subjective interests of those in power.  It is on this basis that the 
conservative movement, particularly under the second Bush Administration, has 
contested climate science in an attempt to disrupt and prevent environmental regulation.  
Actions which have directly benefitted the economic interests of elites.  Using doubt, 
obfuscation, and diffusion as tools, they successfully thwarted the goals of the 
environmental movement for over 20 years.  
While these analyses are important in dissecting the tactical frameworks 
employed by powerful institutions, what insulates these positions from contestation is the 
anonymity and relative invisibility of these elites.  The findings of this study demonstrate 
that when science is challenged in the media, as was the case when Hansen testified 
before congress, the scrutiny applied to the methods of scientific analysis.  One such 
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example was that of the “hockey stick” scandal (The Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2012).  
Here, anti-climate change advocates viewed a leaked strategic exclusion of an 
inconsistent indicator of climate change as a manipulation of data, a charge which has 
since been invalidated and all parties exonerated (https://phys.org/news/2014-07-
vindicates-climate-accused.html)).  Similar tactics include quoting specific scientists’ 
reluctance to use the study of micro-level phenomenon as representative of climate 
change.  When voicing these critiques the scientist is always identified by name, 
credential, and institutional affiliation.  I argue that these efforts are part of an attempt to 
isolate the scientist.  Viewing the science as an isolated event symbolically disassociates 
it from a generalization.  This disassociation implies a lack of consensus, relegates the 
power of their voice to the level of the individual, thus denying the correlation between 
emissions and climate change.  This promotes the finding as an individual one, a single 
issue that requires more substantial evidence than a social problem that demands a 
political solution (Cable, Shriver, Mix 2008).  Contrastingly, until the latter part of the 
time series, media rarely, if ever, isolates industry elites in the same fashion.  This 
invisibility framing strategy demonstrates how political and economic actors obfuscate 
elite actors and their powerful intentions in society (Mills 1956).  Not only is the working 
power of the elite withheld from public view, but few are even aware of the extent to 
which it penetrates society.  This secrecy serves to mask and obscure elite identities, their 
networks, and their intentions.  This invisibility always works to the benefit of the elite 
due to their connection with, and proximity to, other decision makers, in this case, 
through economic and political affiliation.  And while this power is not altogether 
“surfaced” through media silence and neglect, the people cannot be but aware of its 
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power.  This being said, “[t]here is nothing conspiratorial about it, although its decisions 
are often publicly unknown and its mode of operation manipulative rather than explicit 
(Mills 1956: 294).  Mills (1956) provides astute commentary on the public’s awareness of 
the presence of elite actors and how that awareness is confounded by their relative 
invisibility in terms of identity and intention.   
 This institutional drive to preserve current elite positions and prevailing 
economic structures (namely the dominance of the fossil fuel industry) is also 
demonstrated through the means by which science is evaluated and misunderstood 
by society.  Anti-climate change frame sponsors use this misunderstanding of the 
scientific process as a means to delegitimize it.  Beyond the common practices of 
denying the often cited figure of the “97%” scientific consensus, industry actors 
attack the necessarily imperfect methodologies of scientific inquiry (Lefsrud and 
Meyer 2012).  Compounding this criticism, industry simultaneously employs 
scientists of their own to manipulate methods to reach a specific outcome (Farrell 
2015b) and intentionally misinterpreting the inaccessible language of scientists 
(Boykoff 2007; Brossard, Shanahan, and McComas 2004).  A multitude of 
examples depict scientists as unwilling to extrapolate micro-level environmental 
phenomena to macro-level indications of climate change but this perceived lack 
of continuity is not described as a logical and scientific fallacy, but as direct 
evidence to refute the existence of climate change, or to suggest it is 
unobservable.  These arguments are symptomatic of a cultural disconnect between 
judicial and scientific value systems (Boykoff 2007).  The public is familiar with 
burdens of judgement in which fingerprints and eye-witness testimony constitute 
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“proof” while scientific inference does not.  Even the common language of 
“evidence” contributes to this confusion.  This burden of proof falls to party 
which seeks to change conventional understanding of our planet.  A trial would 
require an incontrovertible level of certainty, or “beyond the shadow of a doubt,” 
to render judgement and prescribe subsequent action for rehabilitation.  The 
etiological nature of scientific inquiry and natural systems prevents such an 
absolute expectation from ever being realized (Brossard, Shanahan, and 
McComas 2004).  Thus the misappropriation of judicial values is used to exploit 
scientific ignorance, create public doubt, support conservative arguments, and 
inhibit regulation.     
 
Socio-economic consequences 
This narrative begins to weaken, or perhaps more precisely, transition, 
over time to that of “socio-economic consequences” (Schlichting 2013).  This 
shift in dominant narrative emerges as a reaction to, and coincides with, the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations and persists through the end of the time series.  This should 
not suggest that the narrative of scientific uncertainty is not still present, but only 
that it is not the most prevalent or emphasized frame among key individual and 
institutional actors.  The combination of these framing strategies adds to the 
complexity of the anti-climate change conservative movement, adding further 
convolution to the overall discourse thus providing more defended spaces that 
environmental advocates and climate scientists need to assail in order to seek 
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policy changes that might undercut the political and economic structures that 
dominate North America.   
This narrative attacks the proposed solutions to climate change as 
articulated through the Kyoto Protocol, crudely reduced to measures that cut 
carbon dioxide emissions to levels 15% below 1990.  The means by which each 
country addressed this challenge was left to that particular nation, as long as their 
target was met.  The United States flatly rejected and refused to ratify this 
proposal citing that it was not in the economic interest of the country, echoing the 
position of President George H. W. Bush when he threatened US nonparticipation 
in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio (The New York Times, March 24, 1992).  These 
sentiments alluded to another prevalent rationale adopted by developed countries 
mentioned previously, blaming less-developed countries for climate change.  The 
United States validated their abstinence from Kyoto by arguing against the 
exclusion of many less developed nations from the accord.  Nations who have 
traditionally been characterized as the most egregious climate offenders.  This 
antagonism persisted even after more comprehensive agreements were proposed 
at meetings like the Bali Action Plan in 2007.  Countries like China and India did 
little to assuage this perception which ossified the rift in the international 
community.  “China's argument in the climate change talks, like India's, has been: 
‘The West created the global warming problem; the West should fix it.’ And 
please give us your technology, preferably for free as a kind of guilt tax, and we'll 
deal with our problems” (The Globe & Mail, August 8, 2008).  While it is true 
that Western countries were the largest contributors of atmospheric carbon 
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dioxide since the industrial revolution, China has surpassed the United States as 
the top global emitter, and India is not far behind (The Wall Street Journal, March 
10, 2010).  At today’s rate, these two countries will be responsible for the most 
significant portion of emissions by midway through the twenty-first century.  
Closing this developmental rift between the industrialized and less developed 
nations, through necessarily including leaders of the latter, will aid in mending 
this schism and is essential to removing geopolitical and economic obstacles that 
inhibit substantial action on climate change (The Globe & Mail, August 8, 2008).  
 While Canada did ratify the Kyoto Agreement, parliament was mired with 
indecision as to how to meet these commitments.  Alberta (as a producer) and Ottawa (as 
a consumer), constitute the two Canadian spaces most responsible for carbon dioxide 
emissions.  Alberta, galvanized by community tradition built on their vast deposits of oil, 
fostered the most stringent opponents of cutting carbon emissions, arguing that cutting 
these emissions would devastate local and national economies as well as the livelihoods 
of Canadian citizens.  Prime Minister Chrétien, and subsequent leaders Martin and 
Harper, relented under fierce industry lobbying and allowed corporations to voluntarily 
adhere to proposed restrictions, giving them license to continue with production 
unabated.  This alliance is legitimated by another framing narrative: “industrial 
responsibility.”  Here, business practices, rather than regulation, should drive climate 
change solutions.  However, faith in neoliberal market ideology without governmental 
intervention changing dominant political and economic structures overnight was 
hopelessly optimistic.  One particular article explores the structural constraints of such 
policy, both in terms of consumer choice, access, and opportunity to install green 
61 
 
technologies on a grand enough scale that would significantly, and dramatically, 
restructure the energy market.  At $20,000 to $30,000 per home, many communities lack 
the discretionary income to consider the installation of solar panels.  Compounding this 
issue of economic inequality, recent legislation uses public health concerns as a means 
for outlawing energy independent homes or communities since secure energy use, safety, 
and consistent access to things like clean water, plumbing and sanitation, cannot be 
monitored or regulated.  These legislative initiatives, which are common in sunshine rich 
states like Florida, are largely sponsored by the Koch-brothers-funded front groups like 
American Legislative Exchange Council.  It is clear that while these solutions have the 
potential to be powerful tools toward changing energy markets, government intervention 
is also required to realize these ambitions15.  Take note, this particular critique and 
recommendation for government intervention occurred in 2006, meaning that this 
expectation of corporate voluntary adherence to the goals of Kyoto persisted for nearly a 
decade through two administrations.  Summarily, market based solutions suggest 
unrealistic circumstances to create dramatic outcomes in market dynamics in a short 
period of time: (a) corporate resistance to reduce energy consumption; (b) lack of 
urgency to reinvest in new infrastructure to satisfy growing energy needs; (a) consumer 
economic capacity to afford new technologies; and (d) consumer access to alternative 
energy sources.  
 The combination of narratives: “socio-economic consequences” complemented by 
“industrial responsibility” is best explained by Mol’s (2010) concept of “ecological 
modernization.”  This philosophy revolves around the unshakable faith that human 
innovation and technological development will resolving environmental problems while 
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allowing traditional capitalist economic modes of production to persist in order to satisfy 
increasing needs for energy production and consumption (Spaargaren and Mol. 1992; 
Mol 2010).  Lack of corporate voluntary action not only suggests that faith in industry is 
misplaced, but that it also hints at the political and economic structures and power 
dynamics hindering the development and implementation of green technologies.  Here, 
economic growth will always supersede environmental responsibility (Foster 2012).  
Indeed, the worldwide economic recession provided the convenient situation for industry 
to emphasize the perceived economic repercussions of regulation: 
This recession will bring about the healthy respect for economic values 
that the Depression did.  People need to recognize that a job is the most 
important thing they can have.  
  
We should use this recession to get the public to better understand how 
our economic system works.  Social goals are OK, provided the public is 
aware of their costs.  
  
It would be better if the recession were allowed to weaken more than it 
will, so that we would have a sense of sobriety – anonymous corporate 
executive (Silk and Vogel 1976: p. 64 as cited in Domhoff 1983: p. 147). 
  
The worldwide economic recession of 2008 served as a prelude to the collapse of Kyoto 
and the withdrawal of key participants Canada and Japan.  Subsequent international 
attempts to reach meaningful consensus on what to do about climate change at 
Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015 resulted in no binding commitments which, 
consequently, did little to change this air of complacency. 
 
Field Power Dynamics 
To tease out the means by which these individual and institutional actors facilitate 
and propagate these narratives, and the degree to which these narratives are reflected in 
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policy decisions, it is important to discern the relationships within and between these 
institutions through time.  By examining the historicity of these interactions and the 
relative position of fields, I demonstrate how and why prevalent oppositional discourse 
surrounding climate change has been effective at forestalling meaningful action, 
primarily through institutional power as articulated through field dynamics.  In this 
section I will interpret relationships between fields and note the dominance of particular 
groups within them that actively resist governmental action to combat climate change.  
As time progresses, I will uncover how actions amounting to dissent from state actors, 
and industry actors within fields, have formed a counter-resistance indicating a departure 
from status quo field orientations and a potential future trajectory in national decision 
making affecting climate change outcomes. 
 
Preserving the status quo 
 The frames and strategies implemented by the anti-climate change coalition has 
been well argued and corroborated by data previously in this paper.  The early days of 
climate change (the Earth Summit in Rio, 1992 as the most salient event) were 
characterized by fossil fuel companies aligning, pooling resources, recruiting allies (in 
the auto industry for example), to infiltrate proximate institutions.  This was all an effort 
to create a formidable defense against a movement of environmentalists, scientists, and 
NGOs seeking to reform current economic productive processes to fight climate change.  
Already the institutional battle lines are drawn with clarity.  Industry with contingents of 
academia and the media disseminate false information with the goal of influencing public 
opinion and creating uncertainty.  Industry also reached “upward” to infiltrate all levels 
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of government, financing sympathetic politicians while foiling those opposed.  These 
representative industrial constituents echoed their patrons’ narratives of economic 
impracticality to national authorities and demonized less-developed nations.  Using 
affluence and finance they directly petitioned decision makers at Kyoto in 1997 and met 
with President Obama behind closed doors to negotiate offshore drilling access in the 
arctic, months after the BP disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.  Given these connections and 
alliances made with proximate institutional fields (Industry, media, academia), 
particularly those in positions of power to affect policy creation and enforcement (state 
institutions at various levels of government), it is easy to see how this well-conceived and 
executed structural network utilized economic power and influence at the highest level of 
the field hierarchy to prevent change.   
The rigidity of a societal processes predicated on economic entrenchment and 
dependence on a particular natural resource is what Freudenburg and Gramling (1993) 
call “developmental channelization” and serves as a compelling theoretical justification 
for North American resistance to climate change action.  This socio-ecological 
observation suggests that based on initial development of the surrounding environment of 
a given nation, society makes crucial decisions on infrastructure and energy needs based 
on existing geographies and the environmental resources present in those spaces.  The 
North American continent is rich in fossil fuels, specifically oil and natural gas.  The 
development of infrastructure to extract those materials, as well as the cultural evolution 
made in concert with a growing reliance on those resources (such as the commuter 
culture in the United States) reinforces and strengthens society’s relationship with it:  
once an area or region takes a given developmental direction, both the 
process of specialization in a given primary activity and the investment of 
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human and economic capital in the capture of linkages tied to that primary 
activity can set in motion a process that may effectively preclude other 
developmental options (Gramling and Freudenburg 1996: 483).   
 
This metaphorical channel is both cultural and economic, ideological and structural.  As 
this society continues to develop further, it ingrains itself in these biophysical, social, and 
structural constraints, making the utilization alternative resources and productive 
processes increasingly difficult.  This intensification of the developmental channelization 
process is called “rolling inertia” (Molotoch et al. 2000: 793).  These two theoretical 
mechanisms illustrate the confluence of social and environmental factors that enable the 
continued societal dependence on fossil fuels, particularly in North America, as a product 
of history and cultural ideology, manifested through political and economic structures.  
 
Acts of dissent and future directions of climate change action 
  While deeply entrenched, this fossil fuel culture and the resulting constellation of 
fields has shown recent signs of faltering, or at least transitioning toward other 
alternatives.  The increasing productive efficiency and economic viability of solar and 
wind energies have put pressure on the socio-economic narrative.  Building on these 
potential technological leverages, actions by other developed and less-developed nations 
(particularly in the European Union) have demonstrated how these technologies can 
satisfy the needs of energy consumption with plans of far reaching installation of new 
infrastructure to reduce emissions below those levels recommended by Kyoto.  These 
nations are not only leading by example, but are also aligning with one another to critique 
the oil dependency of Canada and the US.   
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A focus of intense media attention across all newspapers, the battle over the 
Alberta oil sands exemplifies the complexity and interdependence of institutional power 
relations between various levels of state government, industry, environmental groups, 
community organizations, and the international community.  Initially, mired in 
continental controversy and contentious politics, Europe enters the fray in fall 2009.  The 
Calgary-based tar sand oil company had a decisive role in the federal election in Norway 
where they had hoped to expand their business16.  Media commentary on this relationship 
was extensive and prolific.  First, production of a Swiss documentary which made its way 
to Canada documenting the breadth of environmental impacts of tar sands oil.  Three 
times dirtier to process than Middle Eastern crude, the byproducts from extraction 
devastate local ecosystems.  They also find their way into water ways which connect to 
adjacent areas extend the damage far beyond the extraction site.  Next, a delegation of 
Chinese journalists that planned to visit “the scarred landscape of northeastern Alberta” 
to give a first-hand description of the degradation.  Conjunctively, US environmental 
activists remain persistent in Washington prior to Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s visit 
to address Canada’s potential drastic increase in emissions should development of the oil 
sands continue and expand.  Further international state pressure preceded the 
international climate change conference in Copenhagen in December of that year.  For all 
intents and purposes, the international community was threatening an informal embargo 
on oil sands foreign investment in an attempt to force Canadian action, or as a prelude to 
limits on trade16.  This not only demonstrates the multi-national pressure exerted through 
alliances between state fields but also complementary efforts by NGOs and the Media 
around this issue, highlighting the complex nature of field dynamics, as well as how 
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alliances create shifts in the overall constellation of fields is useful in predicting future 
trajectories and outcomes from those relationships (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). 
 To challenge the economic viability of fossil fuels, other interesting institutional 
relationships have unveiled new developments in field contestation.  Class action lawsuits 
all across America are being brought against the United States for climate change 
negligence.  This party claims the air itself as a public trust.  Lisa Heinzerling, an 
environmental law expert at Georgetown University, said of the new suit, ''Part of this is 
keeping the issue alive in lots of different settings and having all the branches, including 
the courts, continually react to it''17 (The New York Times, May 5, 2011).  Reacting to 
state ineffectiveness in addressing climate change, an alliance of public constituents have 
formed a resistance group.  This group identified an opportunity to challenge dominant 
power structures using the “rules of the game” and pursued this opportunity through non-
traditional channels via adjacent fields to realize this goal (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  
Perhaps the most impactful change in the orientation of greater constellation of 
fields which may indicate a new trajectory in field dynamics has occurred within fields.  
Developing in the latter part of this time series, the once unified coalition of industry 
actors has begun to fragment.  Moving away from their stalwart position resisting climate 
action, many key constituents of the fossil fuel industry are beginning to make 
preparations for inevitable governmental intervention.  A number of articles in these data 
showcase the actions of an institutional coalition, indicated by the presence of various 
NGOs and multiple levels of state governments, divesting assets held in fossil fuels that 
are worth in excess of $50 billion dollars from their portfolios.  Additionally, the 
divestment by individuals has added another billion dollars to this total.  The Rockefeller 
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Brothers Fund, a philanthropic arm of Standard Oil, was the most remarkable of these.  
Due to the notoriety of the Rockefeller name predicated on their traditional ties to 
resource extraction, this specific action constitutes a political statement.  Primarily 
because this announcement came only days prior to the United Nations climate summit 
meeting in New York City in the fall of 201418.  While many of these constituents 
concede that their actions are unlikely to have a dramatic impact on the policy of fossil 
fuel companies, the gesture is a critical first step in highlighting the discursive character 
of current American energy markets, deteriorates the perception of solidarity behind the 
socio-economic narrative, and subsequently diminishes the power of those institutions 
and structures that depend on it.   
These sentiments are not limited the economic sector.  In a gesture of huge 
symbolic significance, George P. Bush (an energy consultant, grandson of Presidents 
George H. W. Bush, and son of George W. Bush) has proclaimed a new direction for 
Texas in regards to fossil fuel extraction and production.  Traditionally, in a place that is 
considered one of the hearts of oil production and a stronghold of oil culture in the United 
States, this departure from conventional republican ideology regarding energy use, the 
young Bush has publicly stated that Texas needs to move in developmental directions 
which makes considerations for the reality of climate change.  Lastly, and most 
importantly, signals from oil powerhouses like Shell, ConocoPhillips, and others have 
demonstrated industry is now taking the threat of climate change legislations seriously.  
At least 29 companies had begun to incorporate changes in the price of carbon (either 
through regulation or consumer solutions such as carbon taxes) into their long term 
financial plans.  Separated from these companies is Koch Industries.  In fact, Koch has 
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attended anti-climate change sponsorship with a renewed commitment.  More precisely, 
they are continuing to focus intensely on opposing any type of tax or price on carbon19.  
This fragmentation of elites, once aligned in their sponsorship of anti-climate change 
rhetoric, has several potential implications.  The first, is a weakening resolve toward 
combatting climate change.  This would signify a divisive new set of goals for some 
constituents of the fossil fuel industry.  A lack of solidarity may also be symptomatic of 
corporate decision makers calculating the futility in resisting regulation to address 
climate change.  The second implication is the visibility of individual actors resistant to 
climate change.  Charles and David Koch are named specifically in this piece as fervent 
opposition to action on climate change, while their former cohort remains hidden behind 
the façade of their business titles.  This could be an indicator of the waning power of the 
strongest remaining vanguard of anti-climate change doctrine which is now out in the 
open.  Further research on developing media discourse could help track the trajectory of 
these groups, especially given the drastic change in perspective from the Obama 
administration to the Trump presidency. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This project first sought to explain how key print news media sources frame 
climate change accomplished was ascertaining the media’s position as an architect of 
climate change discourse.  Surprisingly, analysis of the utterance level or tone of print 
news media sourced for this study showed consistent and growing support for the reality 
of climate change through time from 1990-2015.  While the distribution of articles 
sampled from The Wall Street Journal remained virtually unchanged supported, were 
skeptical of, or denied the existence of climate change over the time period of this study, 
an overall trend toward accepting climate change persisted regardless of a publications’ 
political lean or country of origin.   
After I determined the standpoint of these data sources, I began an historical 
exploration of action and collective strategic action frames in order to situate prominent 
institutions and their relative positions within the context of climate change.  Despite a 
general media endorsement and growing support (both public and academic) for the 
scientific consensus on climate change, policy decision makers made little progress in 
instituting aggressive regulation to combat the threat.  Industrial and governmental 
resistance to meaningful action in North America remained steadfast.  Some media 
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executives point to the explosion of alternative media sources for news, primarily from 
television and online sources, as a force that diminishes the influence of traditional print 
news media on constructing public discourse.  However, research on advertising practices 
has found no evidence to support the assertion that the print news media industry is 
declining as a result of the influx of online news sources (Ahlers 2006).  Further research 
on this topic would better illustrate the impact of these news media platforms on the 
relevance of print news media in the digital age.      
 The efforts of environmental groups and state agencies in combatting climate 
change in North America have been largely ineffective.  Preserving fossil fuel industry 
interests have remained a priority in spite of overwhelming scientific consensus on the 
negative implications of climate change, even when industry representatives no longer 
refute these dangers (The Globe and Mail, September 10, 2010; The New York Times, 
January 7, 2011; The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2013).  The rationale for this 
intransigence has evolved through time.  The first argument revolved around the science 
of climate change, or the frame of “scientific uncertainty.”  Industry representatives, and 
their allies in adjacent fields, implemented a variety of narrative strategies to contend 
anthropogenic climate change.  These contestations fell into three prominent categories: 
(1) there is not enough data to support the reality of climate change; (2) the global climate 
system is too complex to observe and thus fully understand; (3) the scientific community 
is in disagreement on the existence of climate change.  As the scientific consensus grew, 
and the development of better climate models and increasingly sophisticated 
methodologies produced incontrovertible evidence supporting the reality of 
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anthropogenic climate change, Industry and their allies augmented and adjusted their 
strategy.   
Economics became the new focus of the “socioeconomic consequences” 
narrative.  Industry and their allies argued that to institute the type of aggressive policy 
recommended by scientists to hedge the looming threat would be civically irresponsible 
and economically devastating.  Agents of industry found greener technologies inadequate 
to satisfy the needs of developed society and too expensive to implement in developing 
countries.  This was especially true in North America. These oppositional positions 
among developed nations corroborates the theoretical concepts of “developmental 
channelization” (Gramling and Freudenburg 1996) and rolling inertia (Molotoch et al. 
2000) in helping to explain the North American resistance to regulating fossil fuels and 
transitioning to “greener” energy infrastructures.  Complementing this strategy through 
2015 is that of “industrial responsibility.”  As the volume of work supporting climate 
change grew, industry provided a more nuanced approach to contending environmental 
regulation.  While opposing the transition to greener infrastructure and production 
processes, they persuaded government officials to allow industry to self-regulate.  This is 
a reflection of their contestation of the anthropogenic nature of climate change, and their 
opposition to government intervention to solve the problem.  Here, industry maintained to 
position of equating government interference with economic stagnation.  By convincing 
government to acquiesce to this neoliberal ideology, industry effectively “passed the 
buck” to future generations.  Echoing the “environmental modernization” thesis 
(Spaargaren and Mol. 1992; Mol 2010), these actors promised the development of 
technologies that would solve the climate change problem, and that private industry 
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would be the ones to do it.  While this project emphasizes the most salient and dominant 
frames implemented in these data, it is important to acknowledge the increasing 
complexity of this strategic frame as time progresses.  Future research should constrain 
the time period to focus on the entanglement of these frames, where they are 
implemented institutionally, and how they interact to reinforce current power structures 
and forestall action on climate change.    
Finally, I interrogated how these frames were utilized by dominant institutions to 
interact with other proximate fields.  These interactions provided clear indications of 
relative institutional position through time.  Additionally, they demonstrated the 
formation of alliances, painting a picture of the constellation of fields and their actions 
relative to climate change.  I argue that the persistence of political intransigence and 
inaction is the product of industry power.  Precisely, the coercive influence that industry 
actors have on state agencies, both directly and indirectly.  These influences are 
innovative, adaptive, and consistent through time.  Industry surreptitiously exercises this 
power through a variety of institutions and across all scales of analysis.  The dominance 
of state and industry actors in print news media discourse is an indication of the 
significance these two actors have in the production and reproduction of institutional 
structures and the orientation of these institutions in the larger constellation of fields.  
Through Field Theory, one would expect the presence of state fields, as the main 
legitimate power authority in crafting the “rules” for non-state fields, as a main 
thoroughfare for political discourse.  The dominance of industry in state—non-state field 
interactions (more than three times that of the next most prominent) is a testament to the 
power and access that industry holds in North American politics and field dynamics.  
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Furthermore, the diversity in relationships cultivated by industry extending to other non-
state fields, which in turn contend action on climate change, suggests industry is prolific 
force in North American politics with myriad connections to nearly all relevant fields.  A 
pattern of strategic industry resistance consistent with past exogenous shocks or crises 
(i.e., the tobacco industry crises of the 1980s) is characterized by three distinctive, 
processual categories; denial, socio-economic consequences, and neoliberal market based 
solutions.  This evidence corroborates past research on industry tactics to combat threats 
to economic prosperity of dominant industry actors (Boykoff 2013, 2007; Schlichting 
2013; and Levy and Egan 2003).  This template for industry action might suggest that 
industry resistance to public health action is divorced from solving these problems in the 
interest of health and extends only as far as preserving the integrity of their economic 
model (Parks and Roberts 2010; The New York Times, June 4, 2014).   
While all of these categorical frames were present, this study finds that socio-
economic consequences remained the dominant frame after the Kyoto negotiations, 
contrasting the conclusions of Schlichting’s (2013) meta-analysis on elite frames in 
which “industrial leadership” took control circa 2010.  The final five years of this study 
suggests a fragmentation of industry solidarity in resisting action on climate change as, in 
spite of Koch Industries persistence in sponsoring fervent climate change denialism, 
significant long-term policy goals by oil constituents toward “greener” infrastructure and 
production practices marked the first concession by industry actors toward climate 
change action.  This departure from traditional industrial narratives could indicate of two 
things.  First, industry is beginning to conceptualize stark opposition to any action on 
climate change as futile, and are maneuvering themselves for a more favorable position to 
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capitalize on a transition away from fossil fuels.  Second, and complementarily, these 
actions could articulate an integral theoretical component of Field Theory: “social skill” 
(Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 2012).  Basically, “social skill” is the ability of 
an individual actor to elicit change in their own field, or the relationship(s) between 
fields, due to unique personal attributes and access and utilization of available resources.  
In essence, agency.  In this case, I point to President Barack Obama as an actor able to 
elicit a change in the strategic behavior of the field of industry due to his second term, 
characterized by his pro-environmental activism.  Actions such as the substantive 
agreement he brokered with China on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the Clean 
Power Act, tougher regulations on pollution emitted by power plants, the retraction of 
leases to drill for oil in the arctic, and the protection of 260 million acres of land through 
the RESTORE Act are a few of these notable pro-environmental actions.  However, the 
climate change denialism that characterizes the current Trump administration, as well as 
the reluctance of Prime Minister Trudeau to impede development of the tar sands in 
Alberta, might indicate a reversal of this trend.  I suggest that further research on the 
potential association between social skill, industry discourse, and climate change action 
could elucidate some of these relationships and the degree to which powerful individual 
actors can influence policy on climate change and other wide reaching social problems.   
“The truth of the interaction, is not to be found in the interaction itself” (Bourdieu 
2005: 148), but instead the interaction is an expression of the power that preserves the 
structures that encompass these interactions (Liu and Emirbayer 2016).  In this project I 
have contributed to the literature by using Field Theory to explore these underlying 
power dynamics to explain why the United States and Canada have resisted taking action 
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on climate change in spite of nearly three decades of research affirming its existence and 
the implications it holds for the planet.  Field theory is a useful analytic tool in exploring 
this phenomenon because it makes several conceptual distinctions that other frameworks 
do not.  Considering the concept of fields, actors are “situated in a place in social space, a 
distinct and distinctive place which can be characterized by the position it occupies 
relative to other places (above, below, between, etc.) and the distance… that separates it 
from them” (Bourdieu [1997] 2000: 134).  This approach attempts to bridge the rift 
between the objective and the subjective, the structural and the agentic.  A 
comprehensive and inclusive attempt most research neglects.  These abstract 
representations of the spatial orientations of social actors are also considered in respect to 
time.  Accounting for the historicity of actors through time gives theorists a framework 
for conceiving future trajectories of these actors and the structures that encompass them, 
allowing for both a diagnostic and prescriptive conceptualization of social problems and 
the actors that engage with them.  I have demonstrated the utility in applying this type of 
framework to a social problem that has been the subject of intensive scholarly attention 
over the past twenty years.  However, there is still a great opportunity to implement this 
theoretical framework more effectively.  By developing and using more sophisticated 
techniques, such as incremental network analysis, future research can enhance the utility 
of field theory.  Furthermore, this project focused almost entirely on the structural 
component of field theory.  In the future, scholars should attend specifically to the agentic 
element of “social skill” to provide a better analysis of the impact of individual actors on 
the overall constellation of fields.  The combination of these two constitutive schematic 
aspects would produce a far more comprehensive investigation of this complex social 
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problem.  Lastly, by including alternative sources of media researchers can attend to a 
broader range of audiences, capturing a more holistic perspective on media discourse. 
These future implications and directions for study can further enhance the conceptual and 
theoretical applications found in this project and further the development of field theory 
in exploring the institutional power dynamics of climate change.    
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX I: TABLE I – NEWSPAPERS CITED 
 
Date Newspaper Publication Article Title 
24-Mar-92 The New York Times "U.S. Under Fire In Talks at U.N. On Environment" 
30-Mar-92 The Globe & Mail "Bush threatens boycott   of Earth Summit in Brazil U.S. 
accused of trying to shape   meeting's agenda to suit its own" 
4-Aug-94 The Globe & Mail "Europe bakes in record heat wave Greenhouse- 
effect debate rages as temperatures soar" 
6-Nov-94 The New York Times "The Nation; For the Environment, Compassion Fatigue" 
7-Dec-97 The New York Times  "Intense Lobbying Against Global Warming Treaty" 
8-Sep-98 The Toronto Star "Controversy gushes over greenhouse gas targets Firms move 
to trade credits for reductions in carbon dioxide" 
2-Nov-99 The Globe & Mail "Germany vetoes emissions-credits plan  Canada's proposal 
to use nuclear energy to meet greenhouse-gas-reduction goal 
rejected" 
21-Jul-01 The Globe & Mail "Kyoto consequences" 
7-Mar-02 The Toronto Star "We must use green technology we invented" 
9-May-02 The Toronto Star  "PM threatens to delay ratifying Kyoto deal" 
10-Jun-02 The Toronto Star  "Graham keen to take on U.S." 
24-Oct-02 The Toronto Star " Hold off on Kyoto, PM told" 
26-Oct-02 The Globe and Mail "The Kyoto Stampede; Oh no, sighs the East.  Those Alberta 
rednecks are at it again, trying to wreck the consensus on 
climate change. But on the eve of the provinces’ Kyoto 
debate in Halifax on Monday, what the oil-patch boys have to 
say about the environment may surprise you." 
11-Jan-05 The Globe & Mail "Tougher Kyoto rules urged; Ottawa's voluntary approach 
won't meet pollution targets, federal documents say" 
28-Mar-06 The Globe & Mail "An urgent plea to go green; 'The world is watching Canada,' 
the Australian author of The Weather Makers tells SIMON 
HOUPT" 
8-Aug-08 The Globe & Mail "Look who's marching up the standings; China's new global 
role is not as a key player, but a decisive one" 
14-Sep-09 The Globe & Mail  "OIL SANDS UNDER ATTACK; The oil sands industry is 
accustomed to defending its image in North America, but it 
now faces a multifront war, with opposition growing from 
Norway to Washington" 
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18-Feb-10 The Wall Street Journal "U.N. Climate Chief to Resign" 
10-Mar-10 The Wall Street Journal "Climate Change 'Quagmire'; Why India's environment 
minister doesn't like Al Gore's approach to global warming." 
10-Sep-10 The Globe & Mail "U.S. Speaker calls for cut in Canadian oil imports; Pelosi 
makes known her distaste for 'fossil'" 
7-Jan-11 The New York Times "Carbon Dioxide, the Bane of Environmentalists, Is in Demand 
in the Oil Industry" 
5-May-11 The New York Times "Suit Accuses U.S. Government of Failing to Protect Earth for 
Generations Unborn" 
15-Mar-12 The Wall Street Journal "The Climate Kamikaze; "The Hockey Stick and 
the Climate Wars" argues that global temperatures have risen 
in conjunction with our use of fossil fuels." 
24-May-12 The New York Times "Offshore Oil Drilling's New and Frozen Frontier" 
28-Dec-12 The New York Times "Time to Confront Climate Change" 
24-Jan-13 The Wall Street Journal "Bjorn Lomborg: Climate-Change Misdirection; Fear-
mongering exaggeration about effects of global warming 
distracts us from finding affordable and effective energy 
alternatives." 
22-May-14 The New York Times  "Pushing Climate Change as an Issue This Year, but With an 
Eye on 2016" 
22-Sep-14 The New York Times "Heirs to an Oil Fortune Join the Divestment Drive" 
25-Sep-14 The New York Times "Florida Goes Down the Drain" 
5-Nov-15 The Wall Street Journal "Exxon Mobil Gets Subpoena From N.Y. Regarding Climate-
Change Research; Attorney General Schneiderman seeks 
information about research and response to climate change" 
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APPENDIX II: NEWSPAPER EXERPTS 
  
1 For the past two years, more than 150 nations have been trying to devise a new, 
stricter treaty to replace the largely voluntary one that they agreed upon five years 
ago in Rio de Janeiro. It is intended to set binding limits on emissions of 
greenhouse gases by industrial nations.  Because confronting global warming 
means altering energy patterns throughout society, a solution to the emerging risk 
of climate change affects practically every conceivable interest group.  Opposing 
a binding treaty are car makers and corn farmers, steel mills and oil refineries, 
electricity producers and the coal miners who stoke their boilers. They claim that 
cutbacks in emissions would raise energy costs sharply, rippling through the 
economy, creating inflation and destroying jobs or sending them overseas (The 
New York Times, December 7, 1997). 
 
2  Ottawa must consider regulating a reduction in the amount of harmful greenhouse 
gases that spew from automobiles and big industries because the voluntary 
approach is not working, federal documents warn.  "With current policy and 
programs, Canada is still going to be significantly off the Kyoto target," says a 
document called Climate Change - Lessons Learned and Future Directions that 
was obtained by The Globe and Mail.  The "voluntary approach and limited 
incentives [are] not sufficient to drive substantive change," says the document, 
dated Jan. 5 and marked "Draft - Secret." So policy makers "need more 
consideration of regulation and taxation to drive behavioural (sic) change and 
technology deployment and uptake" (The Globe & Mail, January 11, 2005). 
  
3  A Canadian plan that would reward countries that export nuclear reactors with 
emissions credits has been denounced by the German government as 
"incompatible" with the Kyoto process.  Canada has been pushing hard in 
negotiations for credits that would allow it to miss its stated target of cutting its 
greenhouse-gas emissions to 6 per cent lower than 1990 levels by 2012. The hope 
was that the other 36 countries participating in the campaign to reduce air 
pollution would allow Canada to set aside its emission-reduction goals as a 
reward for exporting nuclear technology -- which emits less carbon dioxide than 
burning oil or coal -- to developing nations (The Globe & Mail, November 12, 
1999). 
 
4  Klein warned that Ontario and Alberta stand to lose the most under the Kyoto 
Protocol. Industries in Ontario that will be affected include steel, cement, lime, 
aluminum, pulp and paper and agriculture. "The provinces to be hit the hardest, 
relative to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will likely be Ontario and 
Alberta," he said.  "Our (Alberta's) climate change plan has been designed to 
tackle climate change without compromising the economic potential of the 
province or the country," he said.  Klein denied that he was simply a mouthpiece 
for the big energy interests, although he was more than happy to stand up to the 
energy sector.  "The issue before Canadians is not Kyoto versus nothing. Don't let 
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anyone tell you that Alberta is recommending that Canada do nothing on climate 
change," he said (The Toronto Star, October 24, 2002). 
 
5  Charles and David Koch, billionaire industrialist brothers, have put millions of 
dollars into advocacy groups and super PACs like Americans for Prosperity, 
which have campaigned aggressively against lawmakers who support climate 
change policy (The New York Times, May 22, 2014). 
 
6  Polls indicated that Americans overwhelmingly supported tough environmental 
rules and said they would pay more for them……But midway through, the decade 
is shaping up as a period of turmoil for the environmental movement. 
Membership and budgets have dropped for most of the national groups. A well-
organized counter-movement of landowners, city officials and industrial 
executives steamed into Washington and halted Congressional work this year on 
strengthening environmental laws. They argued that environmentalists were 
exaggerating and using inconclusive data to frighten people and influence 
lawmakers (The New York Times, November 6, 1994). 
 
7  Any such regulations are likely to be strongly opposed by industry and will 
require real persistence on the administration's part. If Mr. Obama takes this 
approach, he will certainly need a determined leader at E.P.A. to devise and carry 
out the rules. Lisa Jackson, the E.P.A. administrator who on Thursday announced 
her resignation after four productive years in one of the federal government's most 
thankless jobs, was just such a leader.  She suffered setbacks -- most notably the 
White House's regrettable decision to overrule her science-based proposal to 
update national health standards for ozone, or smog. But she accomplished much, 
including tougher standards for power plant emissions of mercury and other air 
toxics, new health standards for soot, and, most important, her agency's finding 
that carbon dioxide and five other gases that contribute to global warming 
constituted a danger to public health and could thus be regulated under the Clean 
Air Act (The New York Times, December 28, 2012). 
 
8  If the Clinton Administration is struggling to strike a deal on global warming at 
talks in Kyoto, Japan, that is partly because warring domestic interest groups have 
spent many months -- and millions of dollars -- on highly effective lobbying 
campaigns designed to limit the White House's options.  But powerful business 
interests have emphasized the economic risks and the need to bring developing 
countries into any binding new treaty, arguments that have strongly influenced the 
Senate, where any pact must be ratified. They say the Administration is going too 
far and too fast, the more so since the Third World is balking at a bigger role.  The 
private-sector lobbying, more intense, prolonged and costly than usual in the 
realm of diplomacy, has reached a fevered pitch this week in Kyoto… …The 
antagonists include big corporations with revenues larger than the economies of 
little nations, labor unions with more members than some countries' armed forces, 
industrial trade associations with headquarters grander than embassies, and a 
corps of professional environmentalists that rivals the diplomatic corps in polish 
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and pinstripes.  "It is as if a large chunk of the lobbying community from the 
capital has been transported from Washington to Kyoto for two weeks," Senator 
Joseph Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut, marveled in a telephone interview 
from Kyoto, where he is an observer (The New York Times, December 7, 1997). 
 
9  Mr. Bush's presence thus depends heavily on the outcome of negotiations at the 
United Nations where 148 countries are drafting a treaty on global warming.  
Virtually all of them support the European Community proposal for the limits on 
carbon dioxide emissions.  The emissions are widely blamed for the so-called 
greenhouse effect, a warming…But they are also a main byproduct of industries 
that fuel the U.S. economy, such as car makers, oil companies and electricity 
providers.  Bill Walker, spokesman for Greenpeace USA, a leading environmental 
group, said: "It's the height of arrogance for the White House to stand back and 
say (the Earth Summit) is not productive.  The White House is blocking progress. 
They are trying to shape the summit agenda so that it reflects the United States' 
agenda, which has been to resist efforts to save the environment on a number of 
fronts.  "We have to transcend business as usual. The only way to do that is for 
Bush to show leadership - he's talking about a selfish agenda. The focus and aim 
of the Earth Summit is to move beyond national prerogatives and on to global 
needs," Mr. Walker said in a telephone interview (The Globe & Mail, March 30, 
1992). 
 
10 Shortly before Thanksgiving in 2010, the leaders of the commission 
President Obama had appointed to investigate the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico sat down in the Oval Office to brief him.  After 
listening to their findings about the BP accident and the safety of 
deepwater (sic) drilling, the president abruptly changed the subject.  
''Where are you coming out on the offshore Arctic?'' he asked.  William K. 
Reilly, a former chief of the Environmental Protection Agency and a 
commission co-chairman, was startled, as was Carol M. Browner, the 
president's top adviser at the time on energy and climate change. Although 
a proposal by Shell to drill in the Arctic had been a source of dissension, it 
was not a major focus of the panel's work.  ''It's not deep water, right?'' the 
president said, noting that Shell's proposal involved low-pressure wells in 
150 feet of water, nothing like BP's 5,000-foot high-pressure well that 
blew out in the gulf.  ''What that told me,'' Mr. Reilly later recounted, ''was 
that the president had already gotten deeply into this issue and was 
prepared to go forward.''  The president's preoccupation with the Arctic 
proposal, even as the nation was still reeling from the BP spill, was the 
first hint that Shell's audacious plan to drill in waters previously 
considered untouchable had gone from improbable to inevitable (The New 
York Times, May 24, 2012). 
 
11  The latest of these shrill outbursts came this week from the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce, which claims "the impact on our economy would 
be devastating if Canada agreed to achieve its Kyoto commitments by 
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2010." The chamber made the unsubstantiated assertion that the economy 
would "drop by up to 2.5 per cent in 2010 under the Kyoto protocol,"… 
…The chamber contends that if Canadian industry is forced to meet the 
Kyoto targets, "it will be impossible for our export industries to compete 
in the market south of the border." Industry will relocate to countries that 
haven't signed the Kyoto protocol, the chamber argues (The Toronto Star, 
March 7, 2002). 
 
12 "Canadian foreign policy can't be divorced from our policy with the 
United States," he said. "Therefore I think our Canadian foreign policy 
and our U.S. foreign policy must be fully integrated and coherent. 
Obviously that is very much going to be the Prime Minister’s [Paul 
Martin] decision." —Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham (The Toronto 
Star, June 10, 2002). 
 
13  Prime Minister Jean Chretien warned the European Union yesterday he 
would not ratify the Kyoto accord on reducing greenhouse gases until it 
"clarifies" that Ottawa can claim credit for exporting "clean energy" to the 
United States.  It was the Prime Minister's strongest declaration to date 
that Canada requires more concessions in the 1997 deal in order to meet 
its targets for reducing emissions to comply with the Kyoto protocol.  
Chretien said the Europeans have the impression the Kyoto deal is closed, 
but "for us we had the impression that it was not over" - that there is still 
room to negotiate just how countries achieve their targets.  Chretien 
argued in meetings yesterday with EU president Jose Maria Aznar, 
European Commission president Romano Prodi and External Relations 
commissioner Chris Patten that Canada's exports of "clean" energy, like 
natural gas and hydroelectricity, should count against its emissions that 
result from burning such fossil fuels as coal and petroleum products.  "I 
tried to be as forceful as I could," he added. "They have not responded 
clearly, but the (EU) president said, 'Let's think about it and see if 
something can be done.' But the goal of Canada is and remains, we'd like 
to be able to sign, and if we were to sign, it would put pressure on the 
Americans to move in that direction, too."  The Kyoto agreement requires 
Canada to dramatically cut its output of so-called "greenhouse gas" 
emissions which contribute to global warming, and energy-producing 
provinces like Alberta are balking at the deal.  But another top European 
official, speaking off the record, did not mince his words. The official said 
that "it would play very badly" if Canada was to refuse to ratify the 
international agreement and merely come up with its own plan to meet the 
Kyoto principles.  "Our position is absolutely clear," the official said. "We 
intend to ratify Kyoto around the beginning of June. It's very important 
that Canada, Australia, Russia, Japan all ratify. I would hope Canada, 
given its environmental record in the past, renews the protocol."  The 
official said that with the withdrawal of the United States, it is crucial that 
other major players ratify the agreement preferably by the end of the 
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summer, when a major sustainable development meeting takes place in 
Johannesburg (The Toronto Star, May 9, 2002). 
 
14  In Congress, Republican environmentalists appear to be terrified of what 
should be the most basic environmental issue possible. Whitehouse blames 
the Supreme Court's decisions on campaign finance, which gave the 
energy barons carte blanche when it comes to spending on election 
campaigns. It's certainly true that there's no way to tick off megadonors 
(sic) like the fabled Koch brothers faster than to suggest the globe is 
warming.  ''At the moment, there's a dogma in the Republican Party about 
what you can say,'' Tom Steyer told me. He's the billionaire who formed a 
''super PAC'' to support candidates who acknowledge that climate change 
exists, that it's caused by human behavior, and that we need to do 
something major about it.  Steyer has committed to spending about $100 
million this year on ads and organizing in seven states. Many in the 
campaign-finance-reform community think this is a terrible idea, and that 
you do not combat the power of right-wing oligarchs to influence 
American elections by doing the same thing on the left. They have a point. 
But think of the penguins.  Florida's Republican governor, Rick Scott, 
who's running for re-election, has been asked many times whether he 
believes in man-made climate change. Lately, he responds: ''I'm not a 
scientist.'' Scott is also not a doctor, engineer, computer programmer, 
personal trainer or a bus driver. Really, it's amazing he even has the 
confidence to walk into the office in the morning.  The governor did visit 
last month with some climate scientists. He began the meeting by making 
it clear that he did not intend to go anywhere near the word causes. After 
the group had pulled out their maps and projections -- including the one 
that shows much of Miami-Dade County underwater by 2048 -- Scott 
asked them questions. Which were, according to The Miami Herald, ''to 
explain their backgrounds (sic), describe the courses they taught, and 
where students in their academic fields get jobs'' (The New York Times, 
September 25, 2014).15  "I'm much happier living in the Sydney 
place," he says, "because you're liberated from this great human feedlot. It 
is very hard to make a moral choice when you're living in a society where 
everything is delivered down a pipe to you. So even for me, it's a greater 
effort to go out and do that, whereas if you set yourself up from the start 
where that just becomes part of the way you live, I think that's much 
easier."  …But he doesn't believe solutions only lie with individuals. 
When he visits Ottawa, Flannery will be meeting with a number of 
politicians, including Environment Minister Rona Ambrose.  "This new 
[Ottawa] government threatening to pull out of Kyoto, I think it would be 
immensely damaging and regrettable for a country like Canada to do that," 
he says, noting that Kyoto needs all the support it can get over the next 
few years if it is to have any hope of succeeding. After all, Australia and 
the United States have still not signed on. (Neither has Monaco nor 
Lichtenstein.) India and China are due to sign on in the second round of 
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talks in 2012, but would be far less likely to do so if they see any free 
riders who have pulled out since the first round or failed to ratify the 
treaty. "There is a very profound question here for a country the size of 
Canada that will have a global impact. And I think to some extent the 
world is watching Canada to see what'll happen" (The Globe & Mail, 
March 28, 2006). 
 
16  The environmental battle over Alberta's oil sands is going global, forcing 
the industry to respond to new attacks on its record and putting fresh 
pressure on Ottawa.  The Calgary-based industry is accustomed to 
defending its image in North America, but it now faces a multifront (sic) 
war. That growing global opposition is highlighted by its role in today's 
federal election in Norway, where the state-owned oil company's plans for 
the oil sands have sparked controversy.  As well, a documentary that 
premiered in Switzerland and is now playing at the Toronto International 
Film Festival depicts the projects' devastating environmental impact; and a 
delegation of Chinese journalists is planning a visit to the scarred 
landscape of northeastern Alberta.  At the same time, U.S. activists are 
continuing their attacks in Washington, scheduling a news conference this 
week ahead of Prime Minister Stephen Harper's visit with President 
Barack Obama to highlight the dramatic increase in emissions that would 
occur if oil sands production is expanded as planned.  The industry 
expects the anti-oil sands campaigns will heighten in the runup (sic) to the 
international climate change conference in Copenhagen in December, 
which aims to replace the Kyoto Protocol with a new, binding 
international treaty to control emissions.  Critics are seeking to discourage 
foreign investment and force Canada to make more-aggressive 
commitments on climate change by targeting what has become a symbol 
of Canada's failure to cut emissions: Alberta's massive, open-pit bitumen 
mines.  The backlash goes beyond some adverse publicity. Global 
companies such StatoilHydro ASA or Royal Dutch Shell PLC are 
encountering growing pressure in their home countries to revisit plans to 
invest in the oil sands, while Ottawa will have to table a credible climate-
change plan - including real limits on oil sands emissions - or face 
international censure and perhaps even barriers to trade (The Globe & 
Mail, September 14, 2009). 
 
17  Advocates of stringent curbs on greenhouse gas emissions sued the federal 
government on Wednesday, arguing that key agencies had failed in their 
duty to protect the earth's atmosphere as a public trust to be guarded for 
future generations.  Similar lawsuits are to be filed against states around 
the country, according to the plaintiffs, a coalition of groups concerned 
about climate change called Our Children's Trust… …Mr. Gerrard said 
that by filing such lawsuits, environmentalists were ''trying to use all 
available options in view of the failure of Congress'' to act on greenhouse 
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gas emissions. The House approved a sweeping bill to limit such 
emissions in 2009, but a more cautious effort died in the Senate last year. 
And the recently elected Republican majority in the House is threatening 
to strip the E.P.A. of regulatory powers related to global warming.  Lisa 
Heinzerling, an environmental law expert at Georgetown University, said 
of the new suit, ''Part of this is keeping the issue alive in lots of different 
settings and having all the branches, including the courts, continually react 
to it'' (The New York Times, May 5, 2011).  
 
18  John D. Rockefeller built a vast fortune on oil. Now his heirs are 
abandoning fossil fuels... …In recent years, 180 institutions -- including 
philanthropies, religious organizations, pension funds and local 
governments -- as well as hundreds of wealthy individual investors have 
pledged to sell assets tied to fossil fuel companies from their portfolios 
and to invest in cleaner alternatives. (The New York Times, September 22, 
2014). 
 
19 A new report by the environmental data company CDP has found that at 
least 29 companies, some with close ties to Republicans, including Exxon 
Mobil, Walmart and American Electric Power, are incorporating a price 
on carbon into their long-term financial plans.  But unlike the five big oil 
companies -- Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, BP and Shell, all 
major contributors to the Republican party -- Koch Industries, a 
conglomerate that has played a major role in pushing Republicans away 
from action on climate change, is ramping up an already-aggressive 
campaign against climate policy -- specifically against any tax or price on 
carbon (The New York Times, May 22, 2014).  
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